“Turkey will NOT remain in the West even after Erdogan”!

The vast majority of the analyses we read and hear about the Turkey, start from a common point: the West does not want to “lose” Turkey and Turkey does not want to leave the West. There is no argument about the former, but about the latter, very serious doubts are now being expressed by very serious analysts in the world's respected media. We hope that in Athens they will take the trouble to examine these scenarios, which want the Erdogan Retrieved from to lead his country on other paths, away from the West. And not only that: the decision to withdraw Turkey from the West is unlikely to change even after Erdogan leaves the Turkish political scene.

One of the most interesting analyses is the one we read in Foreign Affairs signed by Aslili Aydintasbas. The title of the analysis is “Turkey will not return to the West”...We think the analysis is very useful and as an antidote to rather dangerous “certainties”.

At the beginning of her analysis, the author cites Samuel Huntington's «The Clash of Civilizations», in which he pointed out that by the end of the 20th century, “the pro-Western tendencies of Turkey's secular elite will be displaced by nationalist and Islamic elements”. It seems that his prediction has been confirmed.

It then goes on to refer to a number of issues that have made Turkey distrust the West and especially the US. On the other hand the West seems to be tired of Turkey's provocations in the eastern Mediterranean as well.

Ankara, says the Foreign Affairs analysis, has already turned to new alliances.

“The Turkish government bought Russian weapons systems - against the wishes of its NATO allies - and cooperated with Moscow on major infrastructure projects, including gas pipelines and Turkey's first nuclear reactor. Together, Turkey and Russia have carved out spheres of influence in Libya and Syria. And lately, Turkey has been luring China by chasing Chinese investment, buying the COVID-19 vaccine produced by the Chinese company Sinovac, and refusing to criticize Beijing's treatment of the Uighurs,” he writes, highlighting:

“All this is not a temporary pivot, but a a deeper change in the orientation of Turkey's foreign policy. In the almost two decades of Erdogan's rule, Turkey has been less interested than before in participating in the European Union and the West in general. Instead, the government has appeared eager to reposition the country as a regional power. While the West is still full of nostalgia for Ankara's historic role in the transatlantic alliance, Turkish leaders, who are highly suspicious of their NATO partners, they talk about strategic autonomy...

Turkey longs, more than anything else, to be an autonomous power. Its new foreign policy is best understood not as a shift towards Russia or China, but as an expression of the desire to maintain a “one foot” in each camp and to manage the rivalries of the great powers. The Erdogan regime has sought this policy change and the permissive international environment has allowed it - but neither a new government in Ankara nor any Western alliance can reverse it. A network of politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and scholars, openly sceptical about alignment with the West now dominate the country's security culture. An independent Turkish foreign policy is here to stay.”.

The AKP

According to the analysis by Foreign Affairs, “the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) increasingly invokes Turkey's Ottoman heritage to justify its foreign policy. The government media praise the expansion of Turkey's military footprint in former Ottoman territories such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and the Caucasus, calling it the “awakening of the giant... Erdogan, in turn, is the «leader of the century» - a modern version of the sultan...

Ankara's military power and Washington's withdrawal from the Middle East have facilitated Turkey's role in regional conflicts. The country's growing defence industry has supplied Turkish weapons to Iraq, Libya and Syria. Turkish drones helped ensure Azerbaijan's battlefield victory against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh last fall.

As the growing autonomy of Turkey's military-industrial complex gave its leaders the confidence to project their power in the region, the Trump's lack of interest in the Middle East and the desire for a smooth personal relationship with Erdogan, gave Erdogan opportunities. Turkey expanded its naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean and built bases in Qatar and Somalia without having to worry much about opposition from the United States. Instead, Russia was the power that Erdogan had to watch out for. The Turkish president established a close relationship with Putin and acted with Moscow's coordination and consent in any deployment of forces abroad. But this cooperation has limits. Russia imposed geographical limits on Turkey's zone of influence in Libya, Syria and the Caucasus, disappointing Ankara.

Erdogan's real ability is to exploit the gaps in the international system and find opportunities to play between Russia and the United States of America. In Syria, for example, Turkey's presence has been a threat to the US-backed Kurdish forces, but Washington also sees it as a source of leverage against the Russian presence. In Libya, Erdogan spotted an ‘opening” and quickly exploited it. In 2019, Libyan militia leader General Khalifa Haftar led an army backed by Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The desperate government went door to door in Western capitals, asking for help. Most Western powers were neither interested nor dared to intervene. But Turkey did: its forces helped to counter the Haftar offensive with minimal military investment. By entering these conflicts, Turkey is creating a space by exploiting the rivalry of the great powers.. Ankara's goal, as Turkish commentators often say, is «to have a seat at the table».

The author does not underestimate the very serious political and economic problems that Erdogan faces inside Turkey. These problems are reflected in the polls which show that the AKP no longer has ratings above 30%,much lower than the 49% that voted for it in 2015. But as Aslili Aydintasbas writes, even if Erdogan falls none of those called to rule Turkey will go against the “ethical wishes” of a large part of the Turkish public, which in the same polls approve of Erdogan's “Ottoman dreams”.

“Support for EU membership is still around 60 percent, not because Turks feel European, but because many understand that membership of Europe means a stronger economy and better governance. As the government boasts about setting up a military base in Libya and bombing Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) targets in Iraq, in Turkey businesses are going bankrupt, shops are closing and pensions are shrinking. The country has so far failed to secure sufficient doses of COVID-19 vaccine. Only 10% of Turks have been vaccinated.

In short, most citizens have yet to see Erdogan's ambitious international agenda that is making Turkey great again. Despite the relentless nationalism of the pro-government media, there is a growing sense among the people that Erdogan is pushing very hard on foreign policy. Turkey seems to have lost its sense of purpose and has alienated too many of its friends, making some strategic mistakes. The same ones that perhaps cost the Ottomans their empire...

Most Western analysts assume that Erdogan will remain in power indefinitely - that the democratic transition is no longer possible for Turkey. Most Turks disagree. Restrictions on freedom of speech, the imprisonment of many Kurdish politicians and other forms of government repression do not guarantee Erdogan and the AKP victory in the next elections, scheduled for 2023.

Erdogan's opponent in these elections will undoubtedly commit to a less “militant” foreign policy and more stable relations with world powers. A post-Erdoğan government may take concrete steps to distance itself from its predecessor. It could mend ties with NATO, normalize relations with regional foes including Egypt and the UAE, or revive Turkey's EU accession talks - even if the effort is futile. Ever the pragmatist, Erdogan himself could attempt a return,back to the West. But it is difficult to imagine that a politician, either from the AKP or from the opposition, would move against the nationalist currents in the country and adopt an unreservedly pro-Western stance.

Long term, Turkey's independent foreign policy will be maintained with or without Erdogan. Ankara will probably continue to assert its sovereignty in the eastern Mediterranean, devote its resources to defence development and expand its reach in regional affairs. Aligning itself as a loyal, member of the transatlantic community does not have the utility it once had and certainly cannot match Ankara's power projection policy. Turkey has claimed the role of heir to an empire and will follow its own path!