The recent violation of the Polish border by Russian drones on 9 and 10 September 2025, highlights Russia's increasing use of hybrid tactics against its adversaries.
This episode is a turning point for European security, as it warns that traditional methods of deterrence are not sufficient. The new reality requires an immediate rethink of political, technological and institutional measures.
At the same time, it brings to light the rapid changes in the modern operational environment, where technology and hybrid tactics are shaping new challenges for national defence and security, while defining the ability to deter and respond.
In particular, the Russian operations «probing» (test operations designed to assess the opponent's limits, reactions and resolve without immediate escalation to conflict), threaten Europe's collective security environment and highlight the need to rethink the mechanisms of deterrence and cooperation between the Alliance member states.
Specifically, Russia seems to follow a predetermined modus operandi using low-cost, but high political footprint means to test the limits, resolve and cohesion of NATO and EU member states.
At the same time, third countries, such as Belarus, which provide it with logistical or geographical infrastructure, multiply the complexity of the response.
In this context, collective security organisations (NATO, EU, UN) are moving quickly to consultative and condemnation processes, but the transition to joint operations requires clear political consensus and full legal documentation.
In other words, Russia seeks to impose political and practical costs on its opponents, without seeking exclusively military victory. It is trying to force Europe to choose between high deterrence costs and a new, less secure «normality».
Furthermore, Poland's activation of the NATO consultation process (Article 4) creates new facts in the context of collective security, underlining both the importance of institutional mechanisms to address hybrid threats and the limits to the speed and effectiveness of the collective response.
At the same time, the direct involvement of allied forces, such as Germany and the Netherlands, which in cooperation with the Polish armed forces shot down Russian drones, highlights the practical dimension of collective deterrence and the possibility of a coordinated response in real time.
The fact that this is the first time that NATO aircraft have encountered a potential threat in allied airspace highlights the the need for constant preparedness and direct communication between Member States.
In particular, the Alliance's Patriot anti-aircraft systems detected the drones through their radars, but without actively engaging them.
Also participating in the night operation were Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, Italian AWACS surveillance aircraft and NATO-managed air-to-air refueling aircraft, underlining both the technological and operational coordination required to protect Allied airspace and collective deterrence.
In this context, Greece, as a country with a complex geopolitical environment and sensitive borders, is called upon to draw lessons from the Polish experience.
In particular, despite clear differences (Poland is facing the Russian threat, while Greece is facing Turkey in the Aegean), the key lessons are relevant and can be effectively adapted and applied to any given crisis.
The principle that documentation, data collection and timely activation of NATO procedures allow for safe and legally sound action regardless of the theatre of operations.
Therefore, the Polish experience provides a useful framework for the formulation of customized Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement, enabling Greece to act safely, legally and effectively, while reducing the risk of a hot incident.
The activation of NATO's Article 4 and the coordinated reaction of the allied forces confirm the importance of early warning, legal documentation and the possibility of an immediate collective response.
For Greece, this highlights the need to strengthen the readiness of its armed forces, develop partnerships and adapt its deterrent mechanism to hybrid and technologically advanced threats.
Such incidents have multiple implications and raise critical questions. These concern international legitimacy, military and operational readiness, as well as the strategic decisions of each Alliance member state.
In particular, questions of international legitimacy and trust are raised as to who will establish the responsibility of an aggressor and through what procedures;
Adequate technical and legal documentation of an incident is not only an operational necessity, but also a prerequisite for political action and international legitimacy.
Also, such incidents lead to increased defence spending and orient European partners towards joint air defence systems and the development of anti-drone systems, with economic, technological and operational consequences for each Member State.
In this context, the proposal submitted in May 2024 to the President of the European Commission, Ms. von der Leyen, by the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis together with the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Donald Tusk, to create a Europe's joint air defence «SHIELD» with Community funding, remains as relevant as ever and vindicates its initiators.
Furthermore, the risk of making the wrong decisions and taking actions that can directly turn a diplomatic crisis into a hot episode is increased.
For Greece, the Polish experience and the activation of Article 4 of NATO offer also, valuable lessons at a practical level. In particular, Greece must pursue two parallel lines of action:
- Active participation in EU and NATO diplomatic initiatives, with clear institutional support, participation in technical documentation mechanisms and support for targeted sanctions based on evidence; and
- Strengthening internal resilience, with an upgrade of the anti-drone capabilities of the armed forces, the strengthening of radar networks and their interconnection with early warning systems, the strengthening cyber-security and protecting critical infrastructure, as well as the setting up an interministerial crisis group (with the participation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Civil Protection, Climate Crisis and Civil Protection, National Security Service, etc.), which will ensure continuous coordination and rapid decision-making. This model will operate on the logic of Holistic approach (Whole of Government Approach) and will combine effective diplomacy, military readiness and national resilience, so that Greece remains flexible, adaptable, decisive and capable of protecting its interests while supporting collective security.
In conclusion, the reaction of Poland during the violation of its borders by Russian drones and the process followed by NATO and its member states constitute an important «legal and operational precedent». This precedent can be used by Greece as a reference point to strengthen the legitimacy and documentation of its own actions in the event of a serious violation of its national airspace.
In a similar incident, as in the case of a violation of Greek airspace by third aircraft or drones, Greece will have the necessary institutional and legal tools to protect its national sovereignty.
At the same time, the country can coordinate with its NATO allies for an appropriate collective response, ensuring that any action it takes is legally informed, coordinated and aligned with international procedures.
This framework provides security and legitimacy in decision-making, without pre-committing to specific actions or military measures.
The precedent of the Turkish Air Force, which on 24 November 2015 shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M bomber operating against Turkish Syrian rebels in northern Syria on the grounds of a temporary violation of Turkish airspace, provides a useful historical context for the evaluation of similar incidents.
In this sense, Greece approaches the right of self-defence through approval procedures and coordination with the relevant institutions, to ensure that all its actions are legally documented and in line with international standards. This right is activated in the context of institutional procedures and collective coordination, without implying automatism in any case.
In this light, the possible legitimacy of any action by Greece is based on three main pillars:
- Valid documentation: recording radar tracks (systematic recording and storage of data collected by a radar on the movement of a target in airspace), ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) / AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) data, satellite imagery, documented data collection and, where permitted, recording of communications.
- Coordinated notification: provide information to allies so that response actions are supported internationally and collective security is enhanced.
- Clear rules of engagement (ROE - Rules of Engagement): defining a gradual escalation from warning to, if necessary, the use of proportional force, always within the framework of international procedures.
The adoption of these procedures provides Greece with an institutional and legally documented framework for the assessment and management of incidents of violations of its airspace.. At the same time, it helps to reduce political, diplomatic and legal risk and enhances the country's deterrent capacity, without committing it to specific actions.
In conclusion, Greece now has a clear and documented framework for the assessment and management of airspace violation incidents.
Therefore, proactive preparation, internationally accepted documentation and allied cooperation are the most effective means to avoid unilateral initiatives and enhance deterrence capacity, while ensuring legitimacy and stability in the Aegean and South-Eastern Mediterranean region.
Author of the article:
Political Scientist – International Relations Specialist
Former Director General - Directorate General
National Defense and International Relations Policy (GDPAAD)
Ministry of National Defense (YPETHA)
