«Reforms» that undermine the cohesion of the Armed Forces and National Defence

On 24 July 2025, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Nikos Dendias, announced the Phase B of the Agenda 2030 reform«, presenting a series of extensive interventions in the structure and organisation of the Armed Forces, with the ultimate aim of modernising them.

These changes, as the Minister stressed, are aimed at creating a more flexible and modern model of administration, reducing bureaucracy, saving resources, and improving the infrastructure and conditions for members of the Armed Forces.

In this context, the 1st Army and the intermediate levels of command are abolished, on the grounds of simplifying the administrative pyramid and increasing flexibility.

Of particular importance is the abolition of the ASDEN (Supreme Military Administration of the Interior and Islands), which, although it was not an intermediate level, had an independent operational mission in the defence of the East Aegean islands. Its role was transferred to the newly established Supreme Military Command for the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (ASDAM), without the new administrative and operational framework being fully clarified.

In order to strengthen the autonomy of the major formations, four Supreme Military Commands are establishedThrace (renaming the 4th Army Corps), Epirus and Macedonia, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (replacing ASDEN), as well as ASDUS, which retains its existing role. Above them is the General Staff of the Army, with responsibility for strategic planning, coordination and supervision. At the same time, the Army General Inspectorate is strengthened and Unmanned Assets Commands are established in all Armed Forces and Corps.

Furthermore, the closure of dozens of camps and military courts continues, while from 2026, conscripts will be enlisted exclusively in the Land Army. A programme of fortification works on the Aegean islands and Evros is also planned, in the framework of the doctrine of «autonomous islands», which aims to maximise the operational autonomy of defence units in crisis or blockade situations.

The Story of the Minister of National Defence Mr. Nikos Dendias in support of this «reform» is based on the need to adapt to growing geopolitical challenges, the lessons of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and the technological developments that are changing modern warfare.

The aim of the reform is to building a more flexible, technologically modernised and effective defence apparatus, with an emphasis on the front line and care for personnel.

But behind the rhetoric of modernisation and flexibility, serious questions are raised about the impact of the changes on the country's interdependence, strategic coherence and deterrence.

Despite the lessons from Ukraine, these interventions lack a coherent strategic plan, undermine operational excellence and distort the institutional management architecture, at a time when the country should be strengthening, not dismantling, its deterrent power.

The announced changes embody a strategic error: while invoking lessons from Ukraine, ignore the specific characteristics of the real opponent. The business environment is not neutral, but specific and geographically defined.

Greece faces neither a static, predictable conflict of the Ukrainian type, nor a war by proxies, like Israel in the Middle East.

It faces a revisionist force with a landing capability and a declared political will to be aggressive, in an archipelagic theatre of operations with exposed islands and a need to avert a first strike.

The uncritical adoption of foreign models, without focusing on the nature of the Turkish threat, leads to false lessons and a strategic gap.

It must be understood that Greece cannot afford to plan «generic» defence. The threat is specific, the geography is inexorable and the cost of a first strike is probably irreversible.

The projected «reform» emphasises technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence, but technology is not a substitute for sovereignty over land. Effective defence of critical areas (e.g. Samos or Kastelorizo), requires a physical military presence, strong command structures and proximity to the local population and geography.

The concepts of «compact power», «technological upgrading» and «front-line reinforcement» are more like slogans rather than an informed strategy.

The concept of «autonomous islands» and the emphasis on fortification works is more closely linked to the doctrines of static defence of the 17th and 18th centuries, when siege was the dominant form of warfare.

In today's dynamic and interdisciplinary business environment, where the reaction time is measured in minutes and sovereignty depends on the rapid concentration and coordination of power, «autonomy» does not ensure deterrence. On the contrary, it leads to fragmentation of forces and loss of strategic control. National military power is not based on isolated «islands of resistance», but on network-centric command, reserves and combined power. The concept of the «excluded island», especially when it is supported by fortifications without a single doctrine, without cross-sectoral support and flexibility, already indicates strategic failure.

The abolition of the 1st Army and the ASDEN, under the pretext of creating a more flexible and modern management model, reducing bureaucracy, saving resources and digital transformation, removes the necessary strategic background for the effective use of technological means, jeopardising the country's deterrent capability.

Instead of signalling rationalisation, disrupt command continuity, weaken operational capability and distort the nature of deterrence. Technology without structures does not prevent, just as flexibility without depth does not protect.

A country under imminent threat cannot afford to experiment with abstract doctrines. It needs command, reserves, local power and a clear message of deterrence. Not slogans.

The decision to abolish the 1st Army is presented as a step towards rationalisation and flexibility, but in reality it constitutes a serious degradation of the operational structure of the Army.

The 1st Army, as the highest command formation and the only Operational Headquarters of the Greek Army, is the backbone of the Land Defence of Greece, the necessary intermediate link between the General Staff and the Army Corps, ensuring strategic coherence, coordinated action on a wide geographical scale (Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly) and immediate and coordinated reaction to large-scale crises on the land front.

Its abolition cancels a level of command that is necessary in conditions of tension, crisis or war, creates a Command and Control vacuum (C2) at the level of strategic business management (at a time when the country needs to maintain strategic depth and unified leadership of its forces), undermines the cohesion of the ground forces and leads to disorganised operational planning at both the strategic and tactical levels.

It is a strategic mistake to think that the only threat comes from the east, i.e. from Turkey alone, in a hybrid operational environment with multidimensional challenges.

The fact that Albania maintains irredentist ambitions and close military cooperation with Turkey, which creates new security conditions on our borders, cannot be overlooked. In this context, the maintenance and evolution of the 1st Army into a Land Forces Headquarters is necessary for the holistic management of the multiple threats facing the country, enhancing the coordination and flexibility of the ground forces at national level.

Without the 1st Army, however, the burden of operational command is transferred excessively to the General Staff, reducing its ability to exercise strategic guidance and planning, while at the same time it will have to take over operational command directly - a practice that is considered unrealistic in the event of a major crisis or war.

Furthermore, the attempted reorganisation risks transforming the GNAF from an executive body for strategic guidance into a centralised structure with operational responsibilities, but without the necessary staff mechanism and the required flexibility for direct command in conditions of crisis or conflict.

This over-concentration, instead of reinforcing intersectorality, undermines it, as it cancels out the intermediate management links that ensured the alignment of the Branches under a single strategic framework. Intersectorality requires interconnection and cooperation, not absorption and deregulation.
The «new structure» is not accompanied by a clear intersectoral framework, leaving the process of cooperation and interoperability between Branches blurred. The abolition of critical land commands upsets the balance of inter-branch, disproportionately weakening the Land Army without a corresponding strengthening in the other Branches.

The 1st Army is also recognised by NATO as a Field Army HQ, with a strategic reserve role in South Eastern Europe. In the event of a conflict, it can take command of allied ground forces in the SACEUR area of responsibility, especially in the Balkan-Black Sea axis. It has participated in major exercises, providing Command & Control capabilities for Army Corps or Division-sized forces.

Moreover, due to its geographical location, it serves as a critical headquarters linking the Aegean, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, supporting the flow of reinforcements to Bulgaria, Romania and the S.E. wing of the Alliance.

Its abolition, apart from the loss of an important national tool, would also mean the weakening of the NATO command architecture in a critical area for collective defence.

The abolition of the ASWEN also constitutes another unfortunate and dangerous decision, as it cancels a proven operational structure with proven competence in surveillance and deterrence in the Aegean.

The ASDEN is not just an administrative structure of the Army. It is the institutional body for operational readiness, deterrence and coordination of national defence on the Aegean islands.

It constitutes a single headquarters for the control of the archipelago, ensures the administrative and operational unification of the islands, supports the flow of reinforcements and reserves in crisis conditions and acts as a critical link between the tactical formations and the GES.

Its abolition, with the intention of integrating its responsibilities into a new, broader Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Higher Military Command (AEMC), dismantles a critical specialized command, downgrades its interdisciplinary function and undermines the strategic coherence of deterrence in the most geopolitically sensitive area of the country.

This option does not strengthen, but weakens the ability to respond immediately and in a coordinated manner in its area of responsibility, creating dangerous command gaps and disrupting operational continuity in the geographically complex environment of the Aegean.

Furthermore, the abolition of the ASWEN disturbs the necessary balance of command between the Branches, since it disproportionately weakens the land component of deterrence, without strengthening a functional inter-branch structure. Instead of promoting branching, a dangerous ambiguity is established. The ASWEN is a guarantor of the operational cohesion of the eastern area. Its dissolution constitutes a breach in this cohesion.

Furthermore, the added value of the ASWEN lies in its deep familiarity with the operational logic of the island environment. It is not just a headquarters, but an organisation with built-in knowledge of the specific characteristics of each island, each unit and each formation operating as National Deterrence Beacons.

This valuable, long-standing experience and local expertise cannot be automatically transferred to a new, non-specialised regional administration. The attempted redeployment, with the transformation of the ASWEN into ASWAM, threatens to alter its specific deterrent role, removing depth and clarity from the country's strategic message in the Eastern Mediterranean.

And all this is not taking place in a time of stability and peace. On the contrary, the realignment is being attempted in an international environment of uncertainty, instability and geopolitical upheaval, and at a time when Turkey is seeking a hegemonic role in the region. At a time when it is investing in its extreme nationalist rhetoric, systematically strengthening the aggressive projection of its military power and instrumentalising every crisis as a means of strategic pressure and blackmail.

Within this context, the choice to abolish the two fundamental pillars of national defence (1st Army and ASWEN), constitutes a strategic error, with direct implications for the operational coherence, readiness and credibility of the national deterrent.

The Force Structure cannot be designed in a strategic vacuum, nor independently of the capabilities and intentions of the adversary. In particular, when Turkey maintains a clearly aggressively oriented military configuration, with the capacity for rapid power projection in the Aegean, the Evros and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Specifically, the 4th Army (Aegean Army), based in Smyrna, is Turkey's main landing force, while the 1st Army in Eastern Thrace has three Army Corps capable of rapid action in Evros. Both formations form an interdisciplinary system of landing and land power, supported by special forces, army air force and naval units.

When the adversary is organised with increased offensive capabilities, the deconstruction of critical structures and the merging of fundamental formations do not constitute modernisation, but a strategic fallacy, which undermines deterrent power and gives the initiative to the one who retains the advantage of the offensive option.

Finally, all of Mr. Dendias' announcements about the change in the Force Structure of the Greek Army are put in an institutional vacuum.

Since there is no updated National Defence Policy (NDP), how is it possible for the Minister of National Defence to make structural interventions that affect the entire operational structure and defence architecture of the country?;

In the Ministry of National Defence, the only institutional document that exists and relates to National Security is the National Defence Policy (NDP), which is a top secret document and derives from the National Security Strategy.

The P.E.A. is the foundation from which all the statutory texts governing the operation of the Armed Forces [Military Situation Assessment (MCA), National Military Strategy (NMSS), General Defence Planning of the Country (G.D.D.H.), Force Structure (F.D.), etc.].

Therefore, since there is no updated P.E.A. which has been approved by the KYSEA and no clear strategic and operational objectives for the Armed Forces have been formulated and recorded in this institutional document, what is the strategic background for the implementation of «AZENDAS 2030»?;

What problem is it trying to solve and what are the implications for national security?;

In conclusion, it should be understood that the Force Structure and National Defence in general, is not an exercise on paper, nor is it a communication firework that is used for the purposes of personal impressionism and small political expediency.

It cannot be subordinated to hasty planning, piecemeal reforms or superficial announcements.

The «new Force Structure» does not result from a well-founded strategic analysis, nor is it part of an institutionally enshrined planning hierarchy that serves the national interest.

On the contrary, it seems to constitute an exercise in administrative experimentation without clear doctrine, without operational documentation, without threat assessment and without institutional consistency.

The modernisation of the Armed Forces is necessary. But to be effective and institutionally legitimate, it must start with strategic guidance, lead to operational logic and be based on a realistic assessment of the threat.

In light of this, those who are unaware of the consequences of their experimentation the cohesion and effectiveness of the Armed Forces, take full responsibility for the operational gap that will arise when the crisis is not a Scenario on Paper, but a reality.