The crisis in Ceuta has highlighted that the exploitation of migration flows directly affects European security and constitutes a complex issue with significant economic, social, political, and geopolitical dimensions.
In this context, the critical question for Greece is whether it is sufficiently prepared to deal with a crisis as complex as that of Theuta.
A crisis which will not only involve border security, but will test the information resilience, operational readiness, interoperability, strategic communication, social cohesion, and the country’s ability to mobilize European and international mechanisms.
To answer this question, we need to examine whether the state apparatus can function as a unified and interconnected resilience system.
In this light, a holistic five-pillar model It could serve as a useful tool for assessing Greece's preparedness.
This model was presented and analyzed in a previous article of mine, titled: «A Holistic Model of European and National Resilience Is Needed to Address the Instrumentalization of Migration Flows» (see: related article).
In this light, the evaluation will begin with the Pillar 1 of the Holistic Model regarding the Border Security.
Specifically, border security is not only about the physical surveillance of borders, but is also linked to the state’s ability to know what is happening within its national territory, to detect unusual activities in a timely manner, and to assess potential threats.
In other words, effective border security requires timely detection and situational awareness.
In this context, early detection is not just about technology, but also the state’s ability to identify unusual events, assess potential threats in a timely manner, and transform information into situational awareness.
Consequently, the first and fundamental prerequisite for addressing a new Theuta-type crisis is the state's ability to recognize in a timely manner that something has changed in the security environment along its borders.
The question, therefore, is not simply whether Greece has surveillance capabilities, but whether the available resources, services, and information can function in a way that allows for the timely detection of unusual activity.
For example, in the event of a sudden, large-scale change in migration flows, Can the government realize within the first few hours that it is facing a situation that goes beyond a routine immigration incident?;
Early detection is possible, so that the government can distinguish a normal fluctuation in flows from a sudden, organized, or unusual development?;
The issue takes on even greater significance, as in today's security environment, a crisis can unfold simultaneously across different domains.
Consequently, effective border security requires multi-layered surveillance and the integration of information from different sources so that individual data points can be assessed as part of a unified picture of the situation.
Another crucial question is Does Greece have a mechanism that can promptly integrate information from different fields and recognize that individual events may be part of a single chain of events?;
For example:
- Who decides that an unusual development constitutes a national security issue?;
- Are there predefined criteria and alert levels?;
- Who has the authority to activate the corresponding mechanism?;
- How quickly can information from the field reach the decision-making level?;
A robust border security system must have predefined capabilities for early detection, identification, assessment, and warning.
Specifically, if a new crisis like the Theuta crisis were to occur tomorrow, Which government agency will be the first to realize that the situation has changed?;
Also, How long will it take for this finding to be incorporated into an official operational assessment?;
The answer to these questions is crucial, because border security is not determined solely by a state’s ability to respond once a crisis has already erupted, but primarily by its ability to detect changes early, assess them correctly, and activate the appropriate mechanisms in a timely manner, before the situation escalates and spirals out of control.
Then the Pillar 2 of the holistic Model of European and National Resilience, which can be used to assess the operational readiness of the state apparatus, is Information Resilience.
In a new Theuta-type crisis, the critical question is whether the government can quickly and reliably transform the individual data points collected from different sources into a unified operational picture of the situation.
Information resilience, therefore, is not limited to the ability of government agencies to collect information. It requires the the ability to gather, cross-reference, evaluate, and synthesize different types of information from various sources, so that an initially vague or fragmented piece of information can be promptly transformed into reliable knowledge for decision-making.
Because it's a different matter when information gathering and completely different, the generation of operational knowledge.
The first one answers the question «What We Know», while the second addresses the crucial question «What does all this that we know mean?».
A state may have multiple sources of information, technological surveillance tools, specialized agencies, intelligence from allies, and access to open-source data.
Its information resilience, however, is not determined by the volume of information it possesses, but by its ability to to link them, cross-reference them, and evaluate them in a timely manner, in order to produce a unified and operationally usable picture of the situation.
In a new Theuta-type crisis, therefore, there must be answers in advance to a series of critical questions:
- Who collects the initial information?;
- Who is responsible for verifying it?;
- Who assesses its reliability and significance?;
- How is information from different government agencies combined?;
- How is information from European and allied mechanisms integrated?;
- Who transforms the individual data points into a unified operational picture?;
- How quickly does this information reach the political leadership?;
- How can we distinguish verified information from an assessment, a hypothesis, or misinformation?;
Therefore, an information-resilient state apparatus is not one that merely possesses information, but one that has a mechanism capable of promptly converting that information into a shared operational understanding and decision-making framework.
Because the true goal of information resilience is not simply to have a lot of information, but to have the right knowledge at the right time to make the right decision.
In light of the above, the Pillar 3 One measure that can be used to assess the readiness of the government apparatus is the Institutional and Operational Interoperability.
Specifically, the next critical issue is whether the various state mechanisms can function as a unified crisis management system.
Why is interoperability important for the ability of different institutions, organizations, and operational mechanisms to function in a coordinated manner, exchange information, make decisions, and act as a cohesive system in the face of a complex crisis.
In this sense, interoperability can be examined in terms of four interrelated dimensions:
- the operational,
- the informational,
- on institutional/administrative and
- on Strategic Communication.
If the Information Resilience refers to the state's ability to generate shared operational knowledge, IT interoperability It concerns the ability of different government agencies to operate based on the same understanding of the situation.
With regard to operational interoperability, in the event of a crisis that arises at the border, it is likely that more than one mechanism will need to be activated simultaneously or sequentially, such as the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, the Hellenic Police, the National Intelligence Service (EYP), Civil Protection, and other relevant agencies and ministries.
The critical Therefore, it is not just a matter of whether all these mechanisms exist, but if they know in advance how they will work together.
Specifically:
- Who identifies the problem, and who takes the lead in the initial response?;
- Who has operational responsibility when a crisis goes beyond the scope of a single agency's jurisdiction?;
- When and through what process are the other mechanisms activated?;
- Who coordinates operational activities?;
- Who decides on the level of the response?;
- Are there established protocols for a crisis that does not fall within the jurisdiction of a single government agency from the outset?;
With regard to information interoperability, it must be clear that:
- Who knows what?;
- Who keeps whom informed?;
- What is the process for transmitting critical information?;
- Who has access to the shared operational picture?;
- Who evaluates the information provided by different sources?;
And most importantly, can the different mechanisms operate based on the same picture of the situation, or does each one operate based on different data?;
The third dimension concerns the institutional and administrative interoperability.
In a complex crisis, overlapping responsibilities or uncertainty about who is in charge can delay decision-making at a time when every moment counts.
For this reason, before a crisis occurs, it must be absolutely clear that:
- Who bears political responsibility?;
- Who is responsible for operations?;
- Who coordinates the relevant parties?;
- Who triggers the crisis management mechanism?;
- When and under what criteria is the KYSEA or another high-level political coordination body activated?;
- Who has the authority to make decisions when a crisis is unfolding faster than normal administrative procedures can keep up?;
Institutional resilience, therefore, is not determined solely by the existence of laws, responsibilities, and organizational structures, but by whether these responsibilities are transformed into a functional decision-making mechanism under pressure.
Finally, The fourth dimension concerns Strategic Communication, which is part of the crisis management process. Specifically, the government must be able to formulate a a unified, well-documented, and coherent government position, which reflects the actual operational and intelligence picture.
Therefore, in the event of another crisis like the Theuta crisis, it must be clear from the outset:
- Who keeps the political leadership informed?;
- Who determines the official government position?;
- Who decides what can and cannot be made public?;
- Who represents the State?;
- How can we ensure that different ministers and government agencies do not present different or conflicting versions of the same crisis?;
- How is Strategic Communication linked to the actual operational and informational picture?;
The answer to the above questions is particularly important because a crisis can be accompanied by misinformation, the manipulation of social media, international publicity, and attempts to influence public opinion.
The State, therefore, does not simply need a spokesperson to speak on its behalf, but a a Strategic Communication mechanism integrated into the decision-making process.
When dealing with a new crisis of the Theuta type, this mechanism must be predetermined and integrated into the decision-making process from the outset.
Ο Pillar 4 which can be used to assess the operational readiness of the state apparatus is Social Resilience.
Social Resilience refers to society's ability to understand, absorb, and manage the effects of a major and sudden crisis, without undermining social cohesion and trust in institutions.
In a new Theuta-style crisis, the sharp increase in migration flows could exert pressure on local communities, infrastructure, services, and citizens’ sense of security.
The challenge, therefore, is not only the operational management of the crisis, but also society’s resilience in the face of panic, tensions, misinformation, and a loss of trust in institutions.
After all, society is not merely the recipient of government decisions, but an integral part of the realm of crisis management and national resilience.
In this context, it should be examined whether the following exist:
- Mechanisms for timely and reliable information of citizens,
- Programs to Support Local Communities which may bear the brunt of the pressure,
- Adequate infrastructure and services to address a major and sudden change, and above all,
- Mechanism for Combating Misinformation and the social tensions that may accompany such a crisis.
For there to be social resilience, therefore, The government should have prepared society, so that it can remain functional, level-headed, and cohesive under conditions of intense pressure, while also being able to manage the social repercussions of a prolonged crisis.
Finally, a decisive role in assessing the operational readiness of the state apparatus is played by the European and International Cooperation.
Specifically, a new crisis like the Theuta crisis would not be just a Greek issue, but also a European and international one.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether Greece will be able to to immediately and in a coordinated manner activate European and international support mechanisms, rather than looking for solutions after the fact, when the crisis has already escalated.
In such a case, it should be clear:
- When and through what process are European and international institutions informed?;
- How are the available European mechanisms and organizations activated?;
- Who represents Greece in European crisis management procedures?;
- How is the exchange of information and a shared operational picture with European partners ensured?;
- How does a Greek crisis at the external borders become a European issue when its scale exceeds the country’s capacity to address it?;
European and international cooperation, therefore, should not be viewed as an emergency aid mechanism which is activated after the crisis has occurred, but as an integral part of national preparation.
Greece He must not only know who to call when a crisis strikes, but to have previously identified the collaboration networks, communication channels, activation procedures, and joint action mechanisms it will implement.
Therefore, the crucial question for Greece in the event of a new Theuta-type crisis is, Will it face the crisis on its own, or will it have at its disposal, from the very outset of the crisis, a European and international network of support and joint action?;
In conclusion, a new crisis like the Theuta crisis will not be determined solely by how effectively Greece responds when it occurs.
It will depend on how well he has prepared beforehand.
Greece Therefore, Rather than waiting for the next crisis, it is useful to adopt the five-pillar framework of the European and National Resilience Model that was presented to assess the operational readiness of the country's government apparatus.
Because a country’s true resilience is not demonstrated when a crisis strikes, but by its preparedness before it strikes.
Author of the article:
Political Scientist – International Relations Specialist
Former Director General - Directorate General
National Defense and International Relations Policy (GDPAAD)
Ministry of National Defense (YPETHA)
