We know that, in the post-war order, even in the period of Cold War, three mainly objective factors shape the framework of a country's choices, however powerful it may be, in its foreign policy.
- Its own position of power, with all that this means, at the juncture, which must take the decisions.
- The respective power position of the country with which it needs to negotiate an agreement.
- The alliances of each side and the possibility of exploiting them.
Bilateral and multilateral international relations are shaped by the international law, but also by the balance of power of the countries involved. Of course, everyone speaks in the name of international law, but everyone knows that, the international relations are mainly shaped by the balance of power.
If the balance of power is equal or relatively equal, then international law has a decisive role in shaping initiatives and decisions, or relations between countries are driven to stagnation.
If we apply this framework to the more than 46 years of Post-Communism, we will be able to interpret the developments in Greek-Turkish relations. Greece begins the period of post-independence in a position of minimal power, mainly due to the Junta, vis-à-vis Turkey, it is internationally isolated, and with the tragedy of Cyprus fresh in its mind.
Then it is on an upward trajectory, and by the end of the 1990s it can look Turkey in the eye.
He is a member of the EU, seems capable of meeting the criteria of the Maastricht to join the EMU, has won the organization of the 2004 Olympic Games, completes the strengthening of its military deterrent at great economic cost, of course, is a reliable partner in the EU and in NATO, mainly as a lever for the exercise of Allied policy in the Southeast Europe.
Ο December of 1999, apart from its own strength, it is a favourable moment for our country, because the powerful countries of the EU want each for their own reasons, which go back to the beginning of the 20th century, to support the great enlargement to the east.
Η Greece takes advantage of this desire and succeeds in integrating the Cyprus on the list of accession countries, without asterisks and preconditions, such as the resolution of the Cyprus problem, which would reverse its accession. In this choice, however, it had until the last moment the veto of the UK and the casus belli of Turkey.
The inclusion of Cyprus took place in 2003, formally in 2004, and is the greatest national success of the last decades, since it ensured the security of the Republic of Cyprus and to a large extent shaped the framework for the resolution of the Cyprus problem without turning up his nose.
Η Turkey had suffered its biggest defeat, and all it could negotiate was to be declared a candidate country for EU membership. She wanted it very much and for many reasons, the Europeans and the Americans partners, it has also benefited our country, because a Turkey Westerly, may be a better or less bad neighbour.
But there was in his decision Helsinki and a clause, which the Turkey to obtain candidate country status in 2004. It should have adopted concrete reforms to bring it into line with the European acquis, notably in the area of the rule of law, and should have resolved any disputes with its neighbours peacefully on the basis of international law. This report was a picture of Cyprus and Greece. The decision went further, suggesting that if negotiations do not bear fruit, the countries should go to the international courts.
By 2004, although there were intensive processes, the Turkey did not solve any problems with Cyprus and Greece.
Our country, in December 2004 Summit Council, chose to accept the nomination of Turkey as a candidate country, even though the bilateral problems between the two countries had not been resolved and Turkey had not recognised the Republic of Cyprus.
From the December 2004, by December 2020, the situation had changed radically. The EU had already frozen the opening of the accession process files after Turkey refused to allow the Cypriot planes and ships landing at Turkish airports and landing at Turkish ports.
Η Turkey had begun to slow down reforms and in some cases undo them. Most importantly, many European countries began to doubt whether it would be right to consider Turkey's adaptation to the European acquis, much less whether they would want it as an EU partner.
But also Turkey, especially after 2011, seems to feel very powerful, declaring in every way that it is not fit for its costumes. Treaty of Lausanne and of Cold War. It now expresses its revisionist policy with aggressive rhetoric and similar actions.
The new Ottoman doctrine found a wall in all directions and especially in the Arab countries, and under the slogan of “zero problems with the neighbours”, proceeded to military intervention in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq at first, and then violated Cyprus' established sovereign rights in the EEZ, followed by the violation of our country's potential sovereign rights in the maritime areas up to the limits of the 6 miles of the established coastal zone.
So we arrived at December 2020 Summit, where the EU requires the Turkey not to repeat the violations of the sovereign rights of its two members, in order to give it the positive agenda it wants. The exploratory contacts began, in a few days, with the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers and political talks are also starting. Turkey has an obvious goal of a positive agenda at the EU Summit in June, what is our country's goal?;
Turkey at the same time declares that it will soon begin exploration for hydrocarbons in the sea areas it considers to be its own, but neither the Greek government nor the Cypriot have not stated that they will resume exploration in maritime zones that they have claimed, in accordance with international law, why? Have they made a commitment to the partners or are they afraid that they will now face the military threat of Turkey, which states at every opportunity that, without its own agreement, it cannot Greece and Cyprus, to do anything in Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea;
There is nothing to suggest that the dialogue will be successful, and not only in the foreseeable future, so as the Prime Minister said last Summer, our country proposes to go to the international court at The Hague, an option that our allies have been pursuing for many years, and this time more so.
It is known, that before the The Hague have proposed a multilateral meeting of the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, a proposal that Turkey had also made, and they instructed the foreign policy officer, Mr Borel, to prepare it. Greece and Cyprus have accepted it in Summit, but they don't publicly project it, because they know that:
- Η Turkey will accept the Cyprus only with the equal participation of the two communities, as is the case in the five-party process to resolve the Cyprus, and not as the Republic of Cyprus.
- Η Egypt and Libya in a multilateral would be closer to the Turkey than with Greece.
Turkey has also consolidated its geostrategic influence in practice, always in violation of international law, in a zone that stretches from the Caucasus to Libya and is at all the tables of international negotiations on the conflicts in this zone, many of which, such as that of Libya, it concerns us directly.
One calm assessment 1999, with 2021, it is easy to conclude that: we would certainly like to turn back the clock to December 2004. And now the question is when and under what conditions we will be better able to negotiate our national interests, because it is certain that at some point we will have to make decisions.
Will there ever be the favourable conditions of 2004 or will they be even more unfavourable than today? Then we will certainly have the clear answer, if it was the strategy of the December 1999 Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the best for our national interests or the strategy of the December 2004 Brussels Summit.
Mitsotakis agrees with Simitis on Greek-Turkish relations, but he cannot say so because the two former Prime Ministers of the New Democracy, Kostas Karamanlis and Antonis Samaras, do not allow him to do so.
