In a move that could mark a drastic change in Europe's security doctrine, French President Emmanuel Macron recently announced a series of «major changes» to his country's nuclear strategy. Speaking from the submarine base at Il Long, the French leader unveiled a new vision of «extended deterrence» that is not limited to the French border but extends to cover the entire European continent, directly involving Greece. This initiative is a response to a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, but at the same time raises serious questions about its effectiveness, as well as about a new arms race.
The core of Macron's strategy is based on cooperation with eight European countries: Germany, Great Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece. According to the plan, these countries will be able to host French «strategic air forces», i.e. fighter aircraft with nuclear capabilities, such as the Rafale, on their territory. The aim is to spread French nuclear capabilities across Europe to complicate the calculations of any adversary. Although France retains exclusive sovereignty over the decision to use these weapons, meaning there will not be the «nuclear sharing» that the Germans desire, but the participation of allies in exercises and the provision of bases makes them an integral part of this new deterrent.
The French initiative is driven by two main concerns. First, the Russian threat, which Macron described as «serious», given Moscow's already massive nuclear arsenal. Second, growing uncertainty about the US commitment to European security. Europeans now doubt whether the US «nuclear umbrella», which has protected the continent for decades under NATO, will remain reliable under any circumstances. Franco-German cooperation, with the creation of a «high-level group on nuclear cooperation», is being presented as the cornerstone of this effort for European strategic autonomy.
On the European front, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, tactical nuclear weapons are important, compared to strategic nuclear weapons. The former make it possible to implement scenarios of limited nuclear war, without any country reaching an all-out nuclear war using strategic nuclear weapons.
Today, France's tactical nuclear weapons are limited to about 50 ASMP-A tactical nuclear cruise missiles, fired from Rafale fighters and with a range of about 500 km, with nuclear warheads of 100,000 to 300,000 tons of TNT equivalent. At the strategic level, France relies on four Triomphant-class nuclear submarines, each capable of carrying 16 M51 intercontinental missiles equipped with multiple independent warheads. By 2023, France's total stockpile of nuclear warheads is estimated at around 290, a number that, while sufficient for a European country to defend itself, is limited compared to the Great Powers.
In turn, Russia has about 300 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying up to 1,200 nuclear warheads, 160 submarine-launched missiles with up to 800 warheads, and about 70 nuclear bombers capable of carrying up to 500 warheads. In tactical nuclear, there are an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 warheads in missiles and cruise missiles, 500 in aircraft, and another approximately 1,000 in artillery and air defense systems, bringing the total to 5,000 to 5,500 warheads, including stockpiles. Although treaties such as New START limited deployable strategic warheads to 1,550, tactical nuclear weapons are not subject to such limitations, giving Russia enormous flexibility in limited warfare scenarios. This superiority is not only numerical, but also qualitative, with advanced technologies, particularly in supersonic missiles, making Russian threats more difficult to predict and counter.
At the same time, the new French strategy is accompanied by a relative military reinforcement. Macron announced an increase in the number of French nuclear warheads, the integration of a new-generation nuclear submarine called «Invincible» by 2036 and the arming of new, improved missiles. These moves, combined with the development of long-range missiles jointly with Germany and Britain, are interpreted by many analysts as a contribution to the arms race, which is steadily resurging.
In turn, Britain, as another European nuclear power, has a more concentrated arsenal. By 2023, it is estimated to have some 225 nuclear warheads, all carried exclusively by Trident D5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, with no tactical nuclear capability. These weapons are deployed on four Vanguard-class nuclear submarines, each capable of carrying up to 16 missiles, with each missile capable of carrying multiple warheads. This focus on the strategic level reflects the British strategy of «constant deterrence at sea», where at least one submarine is always on patrol, ensuring retaliatory capability even in the event of a surprise attack.
On the US-built TridentD5 missile, the United States and Britain have dual launch control. The extent to which the United Kingdom can control nuclear launches without involving the United States in a war is a big question. At the same time, the absence of tactical nuclear weapons drastically limits Britain's flexibility in limited escalation scenarios, where the use of strategic weapons would amount to full nuclear war.
From Russia's point of view, this development constitutes a new threat, albeit a manageable one. Any airfield in Poland, Germany or elsewhere that hosts French nuclear aircraft could now be considered a legitimate military target in the event of a conflict. This increases the risk of a nuclear escalation in Europe. In conclusion, Macron's initiative, although presented as a means of strengthening European defence, seems to be leading Europe into a new phase of strategic instability, redefining the lines of risk and turning states such as Greece into potential sites of a future nuclear confrontation.
