The «Cyprus problem» has occupied many Greek, Cypriot and foreign political analysts. In 2019, the Czech Publishing House «Epochi» published a book by a group of scholars from the Faculty of Philosophy of Charles University in Prague - led by Jan Koura, PhD. «The Divided Island - The Cold War and the Cyprus problem in the period 1960-1974».
I read the book in Czech with great care and I felt it was my duty to present it to the HuffPost of Greece a summary of this new review of the «Cyprus problem», which emphasizes the role played by the major powers in the development of Cyprus in the context of the then Cold War.
However, the present conditions, which I will try to summarise in the second part of this article, are very reminiscent of the pre-1974 situation.
Nationalism and Great Britain
The nationalist conflicts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots go deep back into the past. The British Administration on the island, dating back to the late 1870s, contributed to their deepening, instead of trying to mitigate them, as he should.
The importance of the geostrategic position of Cyprus increased after World War II, due to the existence of air bases. These have played an important role in the UK's security plans in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Apart from the bases from which bomber planes could reach the southern border of the Soviet Union or the Suez area in a short time, there are also modern electronic surveillance and interception means, which, apart from Great Britain, also served the USA. From there they monitored the military and space activities of the Soviet Union. The name given to Cyprus as ”the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean” further underlines its strategic importance.
However, after the outbreak of the armed struggle against the British - on April 1, 1955 - which soon escalated into bloody clashes between both ethnic communities on the island - coupled with the failure of the Suez operation, the UK was forced to review its policy.
After first the National Lord Makarios abandoned the idea of the «Union’, the British finally agreed to grant independence to Cyprus, but on condition that they would retain their bases. However, the Constitution of the newly formed Republic gave too much power to the Turkish Cypriots, even though they constituted only 18% of the population. Thus, the two communities could not agree on the issue of governing the country, nor could they create a unified army. It soon became clear that the situation was dysfunctional in its then form.
Three years later, Greek Cypriot efforts to revise the constitution led to the liberation of ethnically motivated violence, which became more or less part of island life until 1974. Many proposals for a solution to the «Cyprus problem» were continually rejected by one of the parties involved, and were often thwarted by the President himself Makarios, whose personal political ambitions and efforts to retain his position led him to seek a helping hand in AKEL and to play an international political game in which it was not afraid to involve the countries of the Eastern Bloc.
The Cold War and Czechoslovakian weapons
The struggle for supremacy between the two main protagonists of the Cold War, which, to a large extent, had an ideological background, did not avoid Cyprus. UK and US alarmed by AKEL's growing influence, which maintained close ties with the socialist countries and rejected the British military presence on the island.
According to the Anglo-Saxon superpowers, the possible participation of AKEL in the Government - which could not be ruled out in the future - could lead Cyprus into the Socialist Bloc. For this reason, they refused to accept the Republic of Cyprus into the North Atlantic Alliance. and help build her army.
The Kennedy administration - faithful to the doctrine of the Cold War as a struggle between «good» and «evil» - overlooks the ethnic problems of Cyprus. It focuses on the growing influence of AKEL, which it considered a much more serious threat to the island.
When the Makarios was not supported by the USA and Great Britain, he began to seek help in the emerging Non-Aligned Movement and on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. The AKEL, with which the Archbishop worked closely, established contacts with countries of the Eastern Bloc, which began to supply the island with military material and to equip military groups built as a counterweight to the Greek-controlled National Guard.
Because of his links with the socialist states, Makarios became known as «the Red Priest» or «the Castle of the Mediterranean». His contacts with the East displeased not only the government in Washington, but also the fascist junta of Athens, which came to power in Greece in 1967. The latter used Makarios' collaboration with AKEL as one of its arguments for his overthrow 7 years later.
At first glance, it may seem strange why the leading representative of the Orthodox Church on the island cooperated with the communist countries. However, it was the policy of the West that offered Macarius no choice but to keep his country independent. Tying up with the Eastern Bloc, which - unlike the West - was willing to sell arms to the Cypriot government and support its independence at the UN, was a necessary/realistic and not an ideological act.
The Nixon administrationwas more moderate from the two previous US administrations as far as the ideological level of the Cold War was concerned, while in the case of Cyprus he no longer considered the influence of AKEL to be the biggest problem.
The disagreements over the future of the island negatively affected Greek-Turkish relations and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which could, if it came to a head, endanger the ongoing «normalisation» of relations with the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, even the Nixon approach still saw the «Cyprus problem» primarily as part of a superpower confrontation between East and West, which threatened US strategic, security and foreign policy interests. The same concept had prevailed in the Soviet Union since the 1960s. Thus, the two superpowers pursued their own ideological and political objectives, while the ethnic problems of Cyprus were of secondary importance to them.
According to the Charles University of Prague Study, another major cause of the partition of Cyprus was the international political conditions at the time, especially the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations., which intensified again after a brief period of mutual cooperation in the mid-1950s.
Neither country wanted to weaken its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, and, therefore, the possible accession of Cyprus to one or the other would weaken the prestige of the other. This antagonism in Greek-Turkish relations had a significant impact on what was happening on the island. Even before the declaration of Cyprus' independence, both Athens and Ankara supported the paramilitary groups there, thus contributing to the escalation of ethnic violence on the island.
The US - as the leading power of the West - began to intervene more intensively in the «Cyprus problem» in the mid-1950s, to become one of its protagonists less than ten years later.
After the prevention of the Turkish invasion of the island in June 1964, the United States finally tried to implement a conspiracy plan to overthrow Macarius, which was for them the main obstacle to finding a way out of the crisis.
This approach, which is totally unacceptable from the point of view of international law, shows that the Americans did not know how to deal with the «Cyprus problem» at the time. They were terrified at the idea of a war between Greece and Turkey and the possible intervention of the Soviet Union. Despite the possible split in the SE wing of NATO, it cannot be assumed that the USSR intervened directly on the island, despite various threats from Soviet leader Khrushchev.
This is evidenced by the fact that Makarios' request to Moscow and Prague - in August 1964 - for the provision of aircraft and pilots to deal with the Turkish bombing of the island was not accepted. However, the crisis further strengthened Macarius' distrust of the West, leading him to seek support from the countries of the Eastern Bloc and to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union for the purchase of military equipment.
Although the Americans finally managed to maintain the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1964, the cost was very high: the deterioration of relations with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, which created the conditions for a much more serious crisis ten years later.
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and the role of Czechoslovakia
In 1974, although the US received several warnings about the Greek junta's threat to overthrow Makarios, it was unable to predict the exact date of the coup because of various factors. The influence or even the role of the US intelligence services in the coup has not been proven.. Nor was the existence of a plan which, as in 1964, in coordination with Greece and Turkey, would lead to the removal of Makarios.
Henry Kissinger decided not to publicly condemn the coup. The policy of equal distances between Athens and Ankara was not successful and led to Turkey's invasion of the island. The international situation was not the same as ten years earlier, when Turkey was afraid to intervene on the island because of American threats.
In 1974, Ankara did not accept the unconditional adaptation of its actions to the US suggestions. Thus, on the 20 July 1974 Turkish forces invade Cyprus, where armed clashes took place with the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, and with the Greek Cyprus Force (EL.DY.K.), a purely Greek military corps. Thus, soldiers from two NATO member states fought each other, using American weapons, which had been provided to Greece and Turkey since the Truman Doctrine.
Czechoslovakia's influence in the «Cyprus problem», which was half-disclosed by recently declassified documents of its secret services, reflects active involvement in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, particularly in arms sales, support for the independent policy of President Makarios and maintaining contacts with AKEL, which had its role in the Cypriot political scene.
Czechoslovakia had been in contact with Cypriot communists since the early 1950s, when the General Secretary of AKEL visited Prague to gain its support in the UN. At that time, however, his request was not granted because under Stalin, the Eastern Bloc states were not in favour of direct support for the independence movement against the colonial powers.
After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Czechoslovakia became more interested in the island, as well as other third world countries that had recently freed themselves from colonialism. It concluded several agreements with Cyprus, and in 1966 signed a contract for the sale of infantry weapons and armoured vehicles.
When the first part of the delivery of military equipment was revealed, causing an international uproar, Czechoslovakia refused to complete it, despite strong protests from the Cypriot side.
This was due to pressure from the Soviet Union, which initially agreed to the arms sale, but after the first delivery was revealed did not want to disturb its developing relations with Turkey. It therefore put pressure on Czechoslovakia to stop exporting arms to the island. Although Makarios eventually handed over the Czechoslovak arms to the international troops of the United Nations, the situation deepened the already shaken confidence of the US, Greece and Turkey in the Cypriot leader. Czechoslovakia was blamed for the escalation of the situation on the island and therefore refused to make further deliveries in the spring of 1967.
The Cypriot President again received aid from Czechoslovakia - in the form of arms sales - in late 1971. The first traditions arrived on the island at a time when rumours began to emerge of the overthrow of Makarios, which was to be carried out by Greece with the tacit consent of Ankara.
It is not yet fully clear why in the end the coup did not take place, but Czech sources offer a possible explanation.
According to the General Secretary of AKEL and Makarios himself, the Czechoslovakian weapons - with which the supporters of the Archbishop were armed - discouraged the Greek junta from finally implementing its plans.
However, this did not succeed in July 1974, when, shortly before «Operation President», Czechoslovakia handed over to Makarios a thousand folding machine guns, which remained unused in the Presidential Palace. The sale of military equipment was of great economic importance to Czechoslovakia. Cypriot orders represented a profitable business opportunity, as Cyprus paid in foreign exchange and, in the case of the 1971 Convention, part of it was paid in advance.
Beyond the sale of weapons, Czechoslovakia helped Makarios maintain power in Cyprus by supporting him in the UN Security Council, of which it became a non-permanent member in 1964. Czechoslovakia contributed with its vote to the passage of Resolution 186 of March of the same year, which called for an end to the violence in Cyprus, non-interference by other states in its affairs, recognition of the legitimacy of the government of Makarios and the the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
Czechoslovakia followed this policy - along with the Soviet Union - for almost two decades. Keeping Makarios in power was a guarantee for them that Cyprus would remain independent, not join the North Atlantic Alliance, while the US military presence on the island will not increase either (especially after the 1967 Six Day War).
Although both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union sold arms to Cyprus, the archival documents do not suggest that the Warsaw Pact states considered the possibility of direct military intervention on the island during the 1964 and 1974 crises.
Despite the neutral policy of Makarios, Cyprus was still considered to belong to the sphere of influence of the West, to which the British military bases contributed significantly.
The Soviets and their allies believed that support in the international arena or the sale of arms to a neutral/dominant state could bring them benefits in the form of weakening Western countries in a strategically important region, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, but without the risk of direct military confrontation.
Moreover, in 1974, the Soviet Union could not - because of the events in Cyprus - risk the ongoing «normalisation» of its relations with the United States.
A story with a long-term tragic ending?;
The above is a summary of a review by Czech political analysts covering the period 1960-1974.
47 years have passed since then and yet the image of the «unsinkable carrier of the Mediterranean» has not changed. In fact, the situation has become so far adrift that perhaps for the first time our «sane» politicians are right that we are at the most critical juncture of the «Cyprus problem». Now, of course, nobody listens to them, because they've been repeating this every now and then for 47 years.
The perestroika and the collapse of «actually existing socialism» may have intervened, the leaders of the great powers, to which the European Union was added, may have been replaced by newer ones, seven Presidents may have passed through the Presidential Palace of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots - and in 2013 Greek Cypriots - may have touched economic collapse, but today the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is worse.
Everybody is lewd on the modern Mediterranean whore called the Republic of Cyprus. Even some of its leaders. The Second Cold War is in full swing.
Turkey is ruled by a «leader» whose practices are reminiscent of a totalitarian regime. The flirtation between Erdogan and Putin (S400, Nuclear Factory Akkouyou and others) is well underway.
From 1974 until today, the leaders of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have had repeated opportunities to solve the «Cyprus problem» with realistic compromises. As far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, let them reflect on their own responsibilities. For us «of the de facto South», the tears of Tassos Papadopoulos, the «cementing of the yes» of Demetris Christofias and the double flight of Nicos Anastasiades from the Geneva and Crans-Montana negotiations are, in my humble opinion, some of the great moments of missed opportunities - to limit ourselves only to those of the 21st century.
Despite the repeated mottos that «better yesterday than today», the current President of the Republic of Cyprus has lost four years - from Crans Montana to today - with his regressions and «exploring the possibility of two states». And when the Turks recently and officially put the issue on the negotiating table, he became «Zorro». Except that he put the mask in front of his mouth and the nose - due to coronavirus - instead of his eyes!
It may be that ordinary people, who have lived harmoniously side by side for dozens of years - regardless of ethnic and religious origin - have realised that living together is no longer possible, but «for the sake of God or Allah», it is not possible for them to reach to share and de jure a «Mediterranean Rock» corresponding to only 0.002% of the earth's surface.
But what I fear most of all is that Erdogan, Tatar and company - in the context of the ’Blue Homeland« - are strategically going much further.I guess their vision is to conquer the whole of Cyprus, as well as during the Ottoman rule (1571-1878).
Already in the «North» the Turkish settlers outnumber the Turkish Cypriots. Since we the Greek Cypriots support them with our decisions to move forward, while the Motherland wants peace in the Aegean! Tourism you see.
Why shouldn't Erdogan be demoralized?;
The UN, the US, the EU, Germany, etc., on the one hand, issue «strict» statements and resolutions and on the other hand, give him billions of euros to «stem the tide of refugees». They let him run Northern Syria, Afghanistan, the Eastern Mediterranean, the EEZ of Cyprus and so on.
And then they talk about international law, about human rights, about respect for human dignity and so many other things. Build your towers in New York, Moscow, London and Limassol, get rich from big business and golden passports, but please, at least shut up! We can't take any more of this mockery!
Dr. Demetrios K. Konstantinidis - Doctor of Economic Geology
