Selective revisionist states, such as Turkey, seek to change specific aspects of the regional or international order—such as territorial boundaries, ideological influence, or the balance of power—without aiming to dismantle the global system, as so-called systemic revisionists do (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea). They operate realistically within existing frameworks (e.g., NATO, the UN, or economic systems), employing gray-zone tactics—proxy warfare, economic coercion, disinformation, cyber operations, maritime provocations, or strategic ambiguity—to achieve their objectives while avoiding open conflict.
Turkey’s selective revisionism, driven by neo-Ottoman ambitions, projecting regional power and balancing NATO and Russia, employs tactics such as proxy forces (SADAT in Syria), maritime claims (the “Blue Homeland” doctrine), and cultural influence (Diyanet in the Balkans). Selective revisionist states such as Turkey include India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Egypt, each of which seeks regional influence through gray-zone tactics—proxies, economic coercion, naval assertiveness, disinformation, and diplomatic maneuvers—while simultaneously engaging in global-scale frameworks (Quad, U.S., BRICS, ASEAN, NATO). India is confronting China; Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are opposing the Iran–Turkey axis; Pakistan is challenging India; Brazil and South Africa are taking the lead at the regional level, and Indonesia and Vietnam are resisting China’s maritime claims. Like Turkey, they balance regional ambitions with global integration, countering the global challenges posed by systemic revisionists. Preventing selective revisionism requires clear red lines, detection, resilience, proportionate responses, ambiguity, alliances, and principled integration, tailored to each state’s supporters (e.g., the U.S. for India/Saudi Arabia/the UAE, China for Pakistan) and their adversaries (e.g., China versus India/Vietnam, Iran versus Saudi Arabia/UAE).
Recently, the challenge to the Law of the Sea and the incorporation of some of its rules into domestic law have become yet another hallmark of selective revisionism.
The recent incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the developments in the Aegean Sea involving Iran and Turkey are clear indications of this new trend.
THE DOCTRINE OF ORMUZ
A new legislative framework is taking shape in the chambers of the Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly—the Iranian Parliament) in Tehran. It is not just another law. It is the institutionalization of a new security doctrine that aims to overturn the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and rewrite the rules of global navigation. The «Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,» as it is called, comes as a direct response to the war that began on February 28, 2026, with the U.S. «Operation Epic Fury» and marks the end of the era of “free passage” as we knew it.
The basis of Iran’s argument is long-standing, but it is now being codified into law. Iran signed but never ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz does not fall under Article 87 on «freedom of the high seas.» It is considered internal waters, and Iran has the sovereign right to regulate passage through it.
What will change in 2026 is that this principle will move from rhetoric to law. On March 30 and 31, parliament approved the bill that sets explicit conditions for transit. The National Security Committee forwarded it to the plenary session as the «Law on Consolidating Iran’s Sovereignty in the Strait of Hormuz.» Majlis Vice Speaker Ali Nikzad described it as “as important as the nationalization of the oil industry” and warned that shipping would never return to its pre-war status.
The draft has 12 articles. The three key ones that were leaked reveal the strategy:
First, a total blockade of Israel. No Israeli ship will be allowed to pass through the strait. Second, war reparations. Ships from «warring countries»—that is, the U.S. and its allies—will pay fees to pass through, as compensation for the damage they caused to Iran. Third, permission from Tehran. All other ships require explicit permission from Iran.
Other leaked articles include mandatory transit fees of approximately $2 million per ship, advance submission of ship and cargo details, a mandatory route near the Iranian coast, and payments in rials, yuan, or cryptocurrencies. The Revolutionary Guards, not the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, will become the competent authority for issuing permits.
The logic is the «economic mirror shield.» If you impose sanctions and damage Iran’s economy, you lose the right to safe passage. The cost of every sanction automatically translates into a transit cost. Want to export oil? Make sure Iran can do the same. If an Iranian tanker fails to reach its destination due to a blockade, the attacking fleet loses its legal right to navigate.
It all began with Operation Epic Fury. The U.S. has launched more than 13,000 strikes against Iran since February 28, neutralizing its leadership and dismantling its infrastructure. Ayatollah Khamenei was killed. Tehran responded by closing the Strait. Shipping traffic dropped to 95%. Approximately 2,000 ships were trapped in the Gulf. The U.S. responded with a naval blockade on April 13.
In this context, Iran considers that international law has collapsed. The U.S. violated Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force. The 5,000 sanctions that had already been imposed were also unilateral acts. Since the West is using its power outside the framework of international law, Tehran believes it must respond in kind. For Iran and other countries, «wars give rise to laws»; therefore, international law is not a fixed set of truths, but a reflection of the balance of power on the battlefield.
This is where the deeper geopolitical significance lies. Iran does not simply want tariffs. It wants to build a new regional system.
First, a division between «us» and «them.» A «green corridor» is being created for friendly countries. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Bangladesh will have preferential access. The West faces exclusion. This undermines the unity of the Persian Gulf and creates an economic incentive to distance oneself from the U.S.
Second, shared responsibility. Iran is introducing the principle that countries hosting U.S. bases bear responsibility for damage caused by Washington. If Qatar or Bahrain provide a base to the U.S., they, too, will pay. This puts pressure on America’s regional allies to choose sides.
Third, an alliance with Oman. Tehran is offering Muscat a share in management and tolls. In this way, it creates a regional maritime regulator outside Western control. Stability in the Strait becomes an economic benefit for many players, not just for Iran.
Fourth, de-dollarization. The demand for payments in riyals, yuan, or cryptocurrencies undermines the dollar’s dominance. China’s Kunlun Bank and CIPS are becoming alternative channels. The Strait of Hormuz is turning into a testing ground for a parallel financial system.
Tehran’s message is clear. The era when the lifting of sanctions depended on a unilateral decision in Washington is over. Iran is calling for a new balance: security in exchange for access. The strait, once a free shipping lane, is now the guarantor of Iran’s territorial and economic integrity.
Unimpeded transit is not an acquired right. It is a quid pro quo for the U.S. and its allies refraining from military action against Iran. Every sanction, every bomb, comes at a price.
The West is in a difficult position. It has grown accustomed to imposing sanctions on weaker countries with impunity. Now Iran has found a leverage point: the 20% of the world’s oil that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. If the law is passed, the world will face an unprecedented situation. The UN principle of freedom of navigation clashes with the principle of power.
Donald Trump stated that Iran «has not paid a high enough price» and will reconsider the plan. Negotiations for a permanent end to the war include opening the Strait in exchange for lifting the U.S. blockade.
Iran believes that modern rules were born during the era of Western hegemony. As that era fades, the rules are crumbling. The Strait of Hormuz is the painful birth of a new world order—one in which power, not treaties, determines the law.
THE LEGAL BATTLE IN THE AEGEAN AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
In today’s geopolitical environment, the rules-based international order is under pressure. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is being targeted by a new category of actors: middle-power revisionists. Countries such as Turkey and Iran are no longer limiting themselves to rhetorical challenges, but are intensifying their use of «lawfare» (legal warfare), incorporating their unilateral claims into their domestic legal systems.
Recent legislative developments in Ankara and Tehran (May 2026) reveal a similarity in strategic reasoning. Both countries are attempting to establish new balances of power through their national parliaments.
Iran, through the Majlis, is promoting a plan for the management of the Strait of Hormuz that provides for the imposition of transit fees and the control of shipping, in violation of the «freedom of navigation» regime. This move by Iran is a response to the attack it suffered at the hands of the U.S. and Israel, and whether or not it is implemented depends on developments in the war.
At the same time, Turkey is moving forward with the incorporation of the boundaries of its continental shelf and the «Blue Homeland» into its domestic law, disregarding the rights of the islands as provided for under UNCLOS.
Neither country has ratified UNCLOS, a fact that allows them to claim they are not bound by it, while at the same time invoking «general principles of equity» only when these serve their interests. They seek to transform international straits or maritime areas into zones of internal jurisdiction, thereby controlling geopolitical balances, energy flows, and trade.
This behavior is not an isolated incident, but part of a broader global trend in which medium-sized and major powers are challenging the dominance of «Western» international law.
China, although not a middle power, is one of the architects of this strategy—because Turkey launched the war in the Gray Zone in Cyprus and the Aegean, 50 years ago. Through the «Coast Guard Law,» China is legitimizing domestically the use of force in waters that UNCLOS recognizes as the EEZs of other states, setting a precedent that medium-sized, selectively revisionist powers are studying closely.
As an archipelagic state, Indonesia uses domestic regulations to restrict the passage of foreign warships, in an effort to enforce stricter rules than those provided for in the international convention.
India maintains a stance of «selective compliance,» enacting domestic provisions that require prior authorization for military exercises in its EEZ, a position not recognized by UNCLOS, which permits the military use of the EEZ by third states.
With regard to Egypt, the recent unilateral demarcation of its western maritime borders (by presidential decree) is an example of the use of domestic law to assert rights in areas bordering Libya, thereby preempting claims by other actors in the region
Middle powers seek «strategic autonomy.» They view international law as a tool used by the old great powers to curb the rise of new regional hegemonies. Thus, “Lawfare” in the Gray Zone becomes the means to redraw the map not with missiles, but with articles and paragraphs.
While Turkey is following the global trend, its own efforts have unique characteristics that make them particularly dangerous for regional stability.
First, Turkey’s move is a direct response to the strengthening of ties within the Greece-Cyprus-Israel axis. Ankara feels that this cooperation, backed by UNCLOS, «locks» it to its own coastline. The legislation regarding its continental shelf is an attempt to effectively nullify the East Med Gas Forum and its neighbors« delimitation claims, presenting its own claims as »state law” that its armed forces are obligated to defend.
Second, Turkey applies the «Blue Homeland» doctrine not only as a territorial claim but as part of its national identity. The incorporation of these boundaries into the domestic legal order makes any retreat politically impossible for any future Turkish government, as it would constitute a violation of the state’s own law.
Third, Turkey consistently applies the “Persistent Objector” doctrine. By steadfastly rejecting UNCLOS and enacting its own laws, it seeks to exempt itself from the creation of new customary law, hoping that in future negotiations, its own domestic legislation will carry the same weight as international treaties.
The «Legal War» in the Gray Zone is the most sophisticated form of modern revisionism and operates in the following ways:
Legitimizing Expansionism: The revisionist power «cloaks» its claims in legal terms. Turkey, for example, does not simply say, «I want the Aegean,» but enacts laws regarding the continental shelf, creating a semblance of legitimacy.
Causing Confusion and Paralysis: By deliberately using vague or contradictory legal interpretations (e.g., challenging the demilitarization of the islands in relation to sovereignty), the aggressor forces the defender into a constant legal and diplomatic struggle, wasting resources and political capital.
Creating a fait accompli: Through internal regulations or charters submitted to international organizations, the revisionist power attempts to transform an arbitrary act into «normality.» If the international community does not react immediately, this new «law» begins to take root.
Legal warfare is used to obstruct lawful activities (e.g., hydrocarbon exploration) by portraying them as «illegal» under the revisionist power’s new domestic legislation.
In essence, legal warfare is the tool that transforms geopolitical pressure into a legal order, making it extremely difficult to counter, as the response requires a combination of legal expertise, diplomacy, and military deterrence.
Turkey and the other middle powers are not merely seeking to win a dispute; they are seeking to change the paradigm of international legitimacy.
If the selective revisionism of certain middle powers—and others besides—prevails, the sea will cease to be a space for cooperation and will be transformed into a mosaic of conflicting national laws, where the strongest will dictate its own «law.».
Source: https://shorturl.at/0BXRJ
Author of the article:
Director of the Geopolitics Website https://www.geoeurope.org/. He also publishes original articles and analyses daily on his personal Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/vangelis.chorafas).
