From 2004 to 2021: George Papandreou's meteoric step

2021 is not 2004, let alone 1981. But the candidacy of George Papandreou points to it. His own face in 2004, when he was the only candidate. Today he has others, he will have a harder time. And the party he will find is small.

But the slogan it promotes («New Change») also refers to the distant past. The original slogan («Change») made sense when it was first broadcast (1981). And it is unrepeatable.

And that leaves the target. Based on what he said, it is twofold:

First, to make the «Democratic Progressive Party» «big and strong» again». He did not say the word PASOK, but this was the party that was once «big and strong». It was, for the last time, in 2009. Then it began its decline, in which he himself has a significant share of responsibility. Under his prime ministry and leadership, PASOK placed all the responsibility for dealing with the bankruptcy on itself.

That mistake (2009) was the beginning of all the suffering, it brought about his subsequent electoral disaster. How will George Papandreou overcome this reality today if he is re-elected leader? The vast majority of the former PASOK voters have moved away: most to Syriza and some - a few - to ND. Is the «New Change» capable of winning them back?;

Second, to contribute «to the formulation of a progressive proposal for governance» in the face of «maintenance». This is where things get confusing. Mr Papandreou does not name the Southwest as «maintenance», but it is obvious that he means it. Therefore, the «progressive governance proposal» can only be formed with other political forces on the left of the political spectrum, with SYRIZA first. Unless he intends to formulate this «progressive proposal for governance» on his own, as leader of the Movement for Change or whatever he will call it.

To achieve, at least in part, these objectives, the following must happen:

The right-wing former PASOK voters, who went to the New Democracy in 2009, should return. At the same time, it must keep the 8% that Kinal got in 2019, a large part of which sees the Mitsotakis government positively, if we believe the polls. How will he convince these voters to participate in forming a front against «maintenance»?;

The left-wing or anti-right-wing former PASOK voters who have gone to Syriza should also return. They will be asked to forget the reasons why they left PASOK between 2009 and 2019. Is it enough to invoke a «new», but so old, slogan («New Change») and the name Papandreou?; Is their disillusionment with SYRIZA such that it leads them back to the old «bed»?;

Papandreou's candidacy does not bother the Southwest, since it is not capable of winning over voters. Mitsotakis would prefer Mr.Loverdos as the leader of Kinal as a potential government partner, if the elections with simple proportional representation impose a coalition government. But Mr Papandreou would not threaten him either.

Papandreou's candidacy, on the contrary, can only have an impact on the opposition. If the opposition as a whole (SYRIZA and KINAL) comes out stronger in the next elections, then the issue of «progressive governance» will arise. It's not the most likely scenario. If Mr Papandreou is elected leader and succeeds in strengthening his party, then it is more likely that we will have some realignment of forces in the opposition, with SYRIZA losing and Kinal or whatever it will be called, winning. In practice, this will lead to a comfortable victory for ND, since neither SYRIZA nor the party under Mr Papandreou will be able to threaten its electoral lead.

These conclusions are, of course, premature. First, the voters who will go to the ballot box to elect Mr Papandreou or Mr Androulakis or Mr Loverdos, or to give a surprise, on 5 and (if necessary) 12 December, must speak out. The size of the turnout, and the result itself, may conceal surprises or (and) disappointments.

By George Karelias