As is well known, the second Conference on Peace in will be held in Berlin on June 23 Libya, under the auspices of the UN. As was the case with the first one, Greece has not been invited to participate in the second one either.
Athens believes it should have been invited because it is the EU country closest to Libya, sharing a maritime border with it, and also because it has interests in the region that are affected by the 2019 Turkey-Libya memorandum.
Regarding this exclusion, most analysts adopt a framework that emphasizes Germany’s special relationship with Turkey as the decisive factor in Greece’s exclusion.
This interpretive framework is correct, but insufficient. It is not only Germany that wants Greece excluded from the conference.
The dominant agenda
The participants in the Libya Stabilization Conference have adopted a multi-level agenda.
First, the participants will discuss the political, constitutional, and economic developments that need to be accelerated in the run-up to the December 24 elections. At the same time, they will assess the work of the transitional government to date.
Second, on the table is the issue of the withdrawal of Haftar’s troops from eastern Libya, the withdrawal of Russian Wagner mercenaries from the road connecting Misrata to Sirte and from Al-Jufra Airport, as well as the Islamist mercenaries from Turkey.
Third, There is no question of the Turkish officers and soldiers leaving. The United States, Germany, and Italy want the Turkish force to remain as a counterweight to the Russian presence in the country, while the Libyan government is also joining them.
Fourth, with the withdrawal of the mercenary forces, Operation PEACE is expected to be transformed from an operation to enforce the arms embargo into an operation to train the Libyan Coast Guard.
This agenda is supported by all the major players in the region—the U.S., Germany, Britain, and Italy, while France and Egypt have backed down from a tougher stance, as has Spain, which will ultimately agree.
One of the key issues for the aforementioned countries is the continued presence of Turkish troops in the country. Some member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, also support this position.
Greek Positions
All of the countries mentioned above agree on this agenda. They also agree that Greece has its own agenda, which differs from the prevailing one.
Greece wants all Turkish troops—whether mercenaries or regular army personnel—to withdraw from Libya. The Libyan government does not agree with this position, with the exception of Foreign Minister Naila Mohamed el-Mangoush, who, however, has been sidelined.
Haftar, who agrees with Greece’s positions, cannot force Greece’s presence at the conference. As for Moscow, it, too, wants Turkey to withdraw from Libya, but Greece’s potential participation in the Conference does not solve any of its problems. Given these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that Russia has sided with Germany, Turkey, and Britain in excluding Greece.
In addition, Greece would also raise the issue of the Turkey-Libya memorandum at the conference, a topic that none of the participating countries would want to address at this juncture.
All of this means that Greece would have attended the conference, had it been invited, with a purely national agenda (the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the Turkish-Libyan memorandum). This agenda runs counter to the dominant agenda of the Great Powers.
This divergence on issues and policy directions is pushing Greece out of the Conference. This is not some kind of German conspiracy, but rather confirmation of the role Turkey plays in the West's plans for the region, even if under certain restrictions.
Turkey's Borders
The continued presence of Turkish troops in Libya is a critical factor in Western plans leading up to the December elections.
However, Ankara's actions do not depend entirely on it. Washington is not going to allow Turkey to remain in Libya unless Ankara severs its ties with Moscow. These ties—marked by both cooperation and rivalry—concern not only Libya but also Syria.
At the conference, Tayyip Erdoğan will have to make concessions if he is to achieve anything substantial. For now, he is buying time and improving his image among the domestic audience.
The U.S. does not feel cornered on the issue of Libya, as it does in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the U.S. is eager to withdraw, and Turkey may claim leadership of the peacekeeping mission that will be established. In Libya, the U.S. does not feel such pressure and can act without restrictions.
If Ankara manages to get what it wants from the U.S. regarding Libya without having clarified its relations with Moscow, then it will have achieved a major diplomatic victory.
