Interview with tvxs.gr and Nicole Livadari
In the heated debate that has erupted in the SYRIZA for the transformation, enlargement, and progressive governance, the «Bridge» has taken a clear stance in favor of cooperation with the Movement for Change. On how—and under what conditions—this collaboration might come about Nikos Bistis speaks to tvxs.gr. He also discusses the issue of factional tendencies, internal party challenges, the prospect of early elections, and those «eager within and around the KINAL to facilitate the NW», but also regarding SYRIZA's stance on Greek-Turkish relations.
– In the statement you submitted along with three other SYRIZA officials (Ant. Liakos, Sp. Danellis, P. Panagiotou), you call for a merger with the Movement for Change. How realistic is this request? In all the polls, the overwhelming majority of KINAL’s base appears to be opposed to cooperation with SYRIZA–Progressive Alliance…
Absolutely realistic, on one condition: that there is commitment from the leadership. Because the objective conditions are in place. They are created by the New Democracy party’s policies, which are bound by its neoliberal obsessions, and by the simple proportional representation system under which the next elections will be held. Those elections are not far off—provided, of course, that the pandemic will allow it. Before the deteriorating qualitative data from the polls are reflected in the quantitative figures as well, New Democracy will call for a second round of voting to overturn the simple proportional representation system. Its plan is to remain in government for 2 plus 4 years. So if the leaderships of SYRIZA —the Progressive Alliance and KINAL—mean what they keep repeating about forming a broad social and political majority that will lead to the defeat of the conservative camp and the progressiveof the country, they must provide a clear answer to one question: With whom will all these fine things be achieved? Because without a clear political alliance strategy—especially under a system of simple proportional representation—all of this will remain empty and ultimately tiresome and meaningless declarations of intent.
It’s not just the KINAL base that’s opposed to cooperation. The base of SYRIZA—Progressive Alliance—isn’t enthusiastic about this prospect either, but it takes a more realistic approach. If relations between the two parties were rosy, we wouldn’t be in this predicament. But the head-on clash that preceded this between the two camps has left a deep mark. This is precisely why we need the will of the leadership—which is currently absent—to stop trailing behind the party base and the polls.
Their job is to transform situations, to sense changes before they occur, to act as leaders according to a plan, to realign the party base, and sometimes to go against the grain. And the logic of reality and numbers is relentless. Without cooperation between the Left and the Center-Left—as they are currently defined and self-identified in our country—there is no prospect for progressive governance. It's that simple.
– How do you assess, from a political standpoint, the latest developments within KINAL—the rift between Gennimata and Loverdos?;
I would not wish to comment on internal developments within another party, especially when it is not yet clear whether they relate to a change in policy or to a leadership issue. I will make a more general observation. New Democracy, which clearly has an interest in preventing cooperation among progressive forces from moving forward, has not yet decided whether it is in its interest to contribute to the further weakening of KINAL or to maintain a small political formation that would serve as the centrist wing of the anti-SYRIZA front. If it loses all hope for the latter, it will proceed with the former. And there are forces within KINAL—and on the fringes—willing to facilitate this. The KINAL leadership seems to be beginning to realize this danger.
– You speak of ”constructive reflection and, where necessary, a self-critical approach” regarding the relationship between the two parties. Do you see a need for self-criticism within SYRIZA regarding its stance during the 2010–2015 period?;
Self-criticism takes two forms: explicitly, or in practice, by changing course. In the summer of 2015, Tsipras partially changed course and spoke of SYRIZA’s illusions, mainly regarding international and, in particular, European relations. Of course, if you read what he writes... Barack Obama In his book *The Promised Land*, which deals with the Greek crisis, you will find observations and critiques that are identical to those of SYRIZA. In any case, the intensity of the conflict before the summer of 2015 led to extremes that damaged the broader progressive movement.
At the same time, KINAL not only supported a failed policy but was also an integral part of the diverse anti-SYRIZA front.
Traces of this policy remain to this day and are still very strong within its ranks. The right wing of KINAL usually outdoes conservative representatives of the New Democracy party. The complicated situation within KINAL is ultimately reflected in an elegant rejection along the lines of: Let’s go with 12%; let SYRIZA–Progressive Alliance drop to 18%, and then we’ll see. The same dynamic exists on a smaller scale within SYRIZA and manifests as a secret hope that the scenario that brought SYRIZA to power in 2015 will repeat itself. It is expressed by a the absolutization of social alliances and the corresponding marginalization of political alliances. A fetish and a nostalgia for SYRIZA’s radical character, which is supposedly threatened by its expansion. This is reflected in the easy way out: since KINAL doesn't want to, we'll go it alone. Both of these approaches are a formula for keeping the New Democracy party in power.
And it is by no means a coincidence that they hide behind the other’s lack of self-criticism in order to refuse the necessary cooperation. Thus, Instead of serving as a catalyst for unity within the coalition, self-criticism acts as an excuse for refusing to cooperate. In the course of real political life, I am convinced that It requires a measure of forgetting the past and a degree of constructive self-criticism. As much as is needed to move forward on the basis of a modern, progressive agenda. Neither can SYRIZA retroactively annul its cooperation with Kammenos, nor can KINAL retroactively annul its alliance with the nationalists on the Prespa Agreement. However, they can reflect on their choices—not to dig in their heels, but to work together creatively.
– Why isn’t SYRIZA—based on the polls—capitalizing on the government’s decline in popularity? Is there a strategic confusion, as some say? Is there a lack of a clear policy agenda?;
The key factor is time—it's still early—and the pandemic, which initially brought people together under the banner—that is, the government—. Both are passing, and the countdown begins. Public disapproval is growing, and this will certainly be reflected in voting intentions. The question is whether we will «get ahead of the curve,» as Charilaos Florakis used to say, and our statement aims precisely to answer that question. I won’t deny that the reasons you mention are also at play to some extent. Citizens are fed up with arguments and accusatory rhetoric, they want an honest assessment of SYRIZA’s time in government, a straightforward plan, and a clear agenda. The pandemic delayed our Congress, which was supposed to address all these issues. I believe that the policy conference we are planning for April will make up for this shortfall.
No, there isn’t. Everyone understands that our program—and our ideas in general—are being tested and implemented in the government. As for the scope and direction of the coalition, there are different approaches—all of them entirely legitimate. In Portugal and Spain, for example, there is an alliance of Socialists and the Left (including the Communist Party in Portugal). I wish we had that option here as well. But realistically speaking, I don't believe that the KKE can surpass itself at this stage. And an alliance with “Day 25” does not create a majority movement. So no matter how you look at it, we come back to our proposal. It is the only one that does not merely add forces together but has a multiplicative effect. An alliance with KINAL could pressure the other left-wing forces to reconsider their stance. The reverse is not true. For better or worse, reality is stubborn.
– New movements and trends: Are they a productive contribution to political dialogue, or do they merely reinforce existing mechanisms and a new cycle of introversion?;
It depends. Both versions have been recorded in the history of the Left. It’s obvious that we’re working toward the first one. Ultimately, it depends on the people, the maturity and self-restraint of the key players, and the democratic functioning of the party itself. It requires special attention, precisely because SYRIZA—the Progressive Alliance—is a party in the making, one that is currently taking shape. Trends are useful when they are combined with the party’s overall and collective effort.
I firmly believe, based on my experience, that a faction within the party is meaningful only if it has clear positions. If it has something concrete, distinct, new, and different to propose. If the outcome is vague, the proposal vague and trite, then inevitably the focus shifts to the names signing a platform and the implications for internal party dynamics, rather than the substance of the policy.
This fuels concerns and leads to accusations of ulterior motives. Precisely because they are aware of these risks and sense the reservations of both the party base and the broader sphere of influence of SYRIZA—the Progressive Alliance— they all deny that they are forming a faction. They speak of a political initiative or a current of ideas—one that, however, requires innovative ideas rather than indifferent compromises. We’ll see. We were pleased by the reception given to the text by the four members of the Political Council of “The Bridge” that you initially referred to. Precisely because it was aimed at addressing the current situation with a concrete proposal, it was accepted by everyone—whether they agreed or disagreed—without suspicion, as a useful contribution to the party’s direction. That is how we will continue.
– Greek-Turkish Relations: We’re entering a new round of exploratory talks with Turkey. Here, your positions as «Bridge» seem closer to those of «Umbrella»… Are there, or are there not, «red lines» in the Greek-Turkish dialogue and in a potential path toward The Hague?;
To be precise, our positions are very close to those of certain comrades who are in the Umbrella. However, in my opinion, the relevant chapter in the text they presented falls short of what is needed and is rather vague. It is most likely the result of a compromise within this faction.
We have chosen to articulate our views on the critical issues that concern the public. We know they are not popular, but we are convinced that they are correct, and for that reason we will stand our ground. In the direction of a comprehensive reorientation of the country’s foreign policy in the broader spirit that prevailed during its formulation Prespa Agreement.
The “wait-and-see” school of thought espoused by Molyviatis and Kostas Karamanlis—which holds that time is on our side in Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue—has led to dead ends and diplomatic defeats. Even worse, it has shaped an inflexible public opinion that believes that the International Law It proves us right on every point, and consequently, any compromise solution constitutes an unacceptable concession and an expression of subservience to the pressures of foreign powers that systematically undermine us. The irony is that this is precisely—albeit in reverse—the view held by Turkish public opinion. The «red line,» therefore, must be drawn against this paralyzing approach, which—with some internal exceptions—the New Democracy party appears to favor.
So, Yes to exploratory talks as the first step in a roadmap that, under certain conditions, could lead to The Hague. The flawed theory of a single point of disagreement imposed by Andreas Papandreou can be circumvented through exploratory talks. The experience of the Simitis government with its 2003 exploratory talks—when it came close to a mutually acceptable agreement on territorial waters in the Aegean—can serve as a valuable guide.
The long-awaited European sanctions—whenever they are imposed—will not, in our opinion, be effective. Finally, regarding the Cyprus issue, a series of misguided decisions by the Greek Cypriot leadership—rejection Annan Plan, shipwreck at Crans-Montana, replacing the pursuit of a diplomatic solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with the policy on drilling and mining– drove from the division on the ground very close to the de jure. The two-state solution is now on the table, following an initiative by President Anastasiades as well. Here, there is no longer any room—or time—for awkward silences.
