Following recent statements by Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis that work on the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) would resume—and given the reactions Turkey has already expressed—the project is entering a new phase.
The crucial issue now is not just the political and diplomatic confrontation surrounding the project, but how Greece will handle the possibility that Turkey’s challenge might move from the level of statements to the operational level.
Therefore, What will Greece do if Turkey obstructs work on the Cyprus–Greece power interconnection?;
This question is of particular strategic importance, because the essence of strategic planning and management of a national crisis lies not only in the ability to anticipate how the adversary might act, nor in having a predetermined response plan—at the military level alone.
It lies primarily in the existence of a system capable of functioning effectively under varying levels of intensity and different crisis development scenarios, promptly adapting its decisions and available tools to changing conditions.
In this context, it must be able to identify early warning signs and indicators of a potential crisis in a timely manner, verify what is actually happening, assess the adversary’s intentions and the level of the threat, support timely strategic decision-making, and manage escalation without losing control of the situation.
Consequently, strategic preparedness requires not only accurately predicting the opponent’s next move, but also having a system in place that can effectively manage more than one possible outcome.
This distinction is particularly important in the context of Greek-Turkish tensions, where a statement, a NAVTEX, a diplomatic protest, or even an operational move at sea can heighten tensions, without necessarily meaning that a crisis has already erupted.
Therefore, the first step in an effective crisis management system is not to react, but to assess the incident in a timely manner and determine whether, and to what extent, it alters the severity of the crisis.
During the situation assessment phase, the following should be evaluated:
- What exactly is the fact?;
- Who caused it?;
- Is this a political message, an operational warning, or an actual obstruction?;
- What is the intention?;
- What is the level of risk?;
- At what point does an incident turn into a crisis?;
The answers to these questions must have been provided before the crisis, not during it.
In light of the above, should work on the GSI resume, the first mistake that could be made in managing a potential crisis would be to fail to properly assess the situation and to assume that any Turkish reaction automatically constitutes a crisis.
It must be understood that Turkey’s obstruction of the project, as an operational event, does not automatically mean that a national crisis has arisen.
The crucial issue is the level of obstruction, its intensity, its duration, the circumstances under which it occurs, and, above all, the ability to control the situation and prevent it from escalating.
Based on the analysis of the above data, strategic decisions regarding crisis management should be made.
In other words, it is necessary to determine what the intended political and strategic objective of (ANSK) and what mix of diplomatic, operational, legal, and communications tools is required to achieve it.
A response, therefore, should not be an automatic consequence of escalation, but rather a choice that serves a specific political and strategic purpose.
Finally, every crisis management plan must include, from the outset, mechanisms for de-escalation and crisis resolution, as well as procedures for assessing and evaluating the crisis with the aim of learning from the experience and strengthening national resilience.
Consequently, decision-makers in Greece should take seriously into account that the onset of a crisis or conflict in the operational theater without a clear understanding of how and under what conditions it can be brought to an end may lead to a dynamic of escalation that is much more difficult to control than initially anticipated.
Furthermore, response levels should be established based on escalation thresholds so that the progression of the crisis does not automatically lead to uncontrolled escalation, but rather be addressed through a gradual and controlled decision-making process.
For example, a Turkish public statement, a NAVTEX, the deployment of naval units, the presence of a warship near a research vessel, a dangerous approach or harassment, the actual obstruction of operations, and an accident or a heated incident.
Consequently, Greece needs a holistic and tiered system of plans and options, with clear activation criteria based on the principle that as the intensity increases, the intensity of the response must be adjusted accordingly, without, however, this adjustment leading to automatic or uncontrolled escalation.
In this context, it is useful to assess the possible scenarios for Turkey’s response to the resumption of work on the GSI.
Specifically, Ankara's possible options, depending on the level of tension, are:
Low-intensity scenarios:
- Rhetorical escalation through statements by political and military officials and a demand for «prior coordination» with Turkey for any survey or cable-laying operations.
- A public relations effort to link the GSI to broader Turkish positions on maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- Issuance of a NAVTEX designating the fishing areas as «illegal» because they overlap with the Turkish continental shelf.
- Diplomatic protests directed at construction companies and the governments of Greece and Cyprus, with the aim of exerting political pressure and attempting to portray Greece as a violator of international law.
- Exerting pressure on executives of foreign investors and contractors by threatening to exclude them from future energy or commercial projects within Turkey.
Moderate-intensity scenarios:
- Harassment of Greek or other vessels participating in the operations, using naval or aerial units and issuing «orders to leave,» claiming that the vessels are located on the Turkish continental shelf.
- Obstruction Tactics (Risk Maneuvers) involving interference with communications, dangerous maneuvers, or creating a traffic jam of vessels around the ship performing the work, in order to increase the insurance and operational risk for the company, forcing it to temporarily suspend operations.
- Deployment of Turkish research vessels or other ships in adjacent areas, with the aim of exerting operational pressure and challenging sovereignty.
- Strengthening of the Turkish military presence in the region without directly provoking a violent incident.
- Issuance of an anti-NAVTEX by Turkey that will reserve the same areas for alleged «military exercises,» in an attempt to create artificial congestion and the risk of accidents.
- A combination of operational actions with diplomatic and public relations efforts, in order to increase the cost of continuing the operations.
High-intensity scenarios:
- A significant increase in Turkey's naval and air presence in the region.
- Immediate operational disruption of operations through the deployment of warships that will force the vessel laying the cable to withdraw immediately under threat of force.
- Dangerous maneuvers or other actions that significantly increase the risk of an accident or a hot incident (e.g., harassment by Turkish drones or aircraft).
- The possibility of a heated incident at sea or in the air, which could turn what was initially an operational issue into a broader Greek-Turkish crisis.
- A large-scale geopolitical escalation leading to a widespread crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The scenarios described above do not necessarily constitute a linear sequence of escalation, as Turkey could choose a different level of response, combine various tools, or move from one level to another, depending on the circumstances and how the situation develops.
The choice of response could be influenced by Greece’s stance, the estimated costs and benefits of each option, internal dynamics in Turkey, as well as the stance of the EU, the U.S., France, Israel, and other relevant actors.
At the same time, the European dimension of the GSI, along with funding and the involvement of international investors and companies, can increase the political, diplomatic, and economic costs of any potential obstruction, though they do not rule out the possibility of a crisis.
Therefore, Greece must be prepared to handle a range of possible reactions, from simple diplomatic and communications pressure to operational obstruction and, in the worst-case scenario, a military confrontation.
In this context, a unified coordination and decision-making mechanism is required, with clear political guidance and a continuous link between the political and operational levels.
Specifically, Greece must be able to act simultaneously on multiple levels, adapting its available resources and elements of power according to the level and nature of the Turkish response.
Specifically, Greece’s strategic response should be developed along five complementary axes, namely:
- Operational Readiness and Deterrence:
At the operational level, a reliable surveillance, protection, and readiness system is required, with clear activation criteria based on the level of escalation.
At the same time, coordination with the Republic of Cyprus and the relevant stakeholders is required to protect the project’s personnel, vessels, and critical infrastructure.
Should circumstances require it, there should be the option of reinforcing the operational presence, primarily with Greek forces and, where feasible and as decided within the framework of existing bilateral, European or allied frameworks, with forces from France and other European countries.
- Diplomatic and European protection:
Greece should capitalize on the European nature of the GSI and ensure that any attempt to obstruct the project is not viewed solely as yet another episode in the Greek-Turkish disputebut will also be assessed as an issue concerning European energy security, interconnectivity, and the protection of European strategic infrastructure.
In this context, timely communication and coordination with European institutions, as well as with countries that have a direct interest in the project’s implementation, can increase the diplomatic and political costs of any potential obstruction.
- Legal protection:
Greece should have a well-documented legal position from the outset, one that can uphold the legality of its actions and counter Turkish allegations at the bilateral, European, and international levels.
Legal preparedness is therefore not merely a tool for responding after a crisis has occurred. It is an integral part of the preparedness strategy itself.
- Strategic Communication:
Communications management should operate in tandem with diplomatic and operational management.
The primary goal should not be a public confrontation with Turkey, but rather to establish the interpretive framework within which the crisis and any potential Turkish actions—should they occur—will be assessed in relation to European infrastructure, energy security, and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The key message should be based on four pillars:
European infrastructure – international law – energy security – regional stability.
In this way, Greece should avoid making the GSI a bilateral issue and should consistently emphasize that the project’s implementation is part of a broader European effort to strengthen energy interconnectivity andresilience.
- Coordination with partners and allies:
Timely coordination is required with the Republic of Cyprus, the European institutions, and the countries that have a direct strategic or economic interest in the region and the project.
This cooperation should not be viewed merely as a means of creating a «united front» against Turkey, but as a mechanism for coordinating political, diplomatic, legal, and operational options.
The involvement of international investors and companies, as well as European funding and institutional support for the project, can also increase the political and economic costs of any potential obstruction.
By combining the above measures, Greece can strengthen its deterrent credibility, limit the scope for uncontrolled escalation, and expand its available options should the crisis escalate.
Consequently, Greece’s strategy should not be based on a single tool, but on a holistic mix of deterrence, diplomacy, legal preparedness, operational readiness, and strategic communication—a mix that can be adapted according to the severity of the crisis.
In conclusion, the resumption of work on the GSI does not mean that a new crisis is inevitable; therefore, Greece must be prepared for the possibility of a crisis and, above all, for more than one form and stage of its development.
After all, true strategic readiness is not measured by how well we know what the opponent is capable of doing, but by how well we can manage whatever ultimately happens.
At GSI, therefore, the challenge for Greece is not merely to protect a European project.
It is to ensure that, should a crisis arise, it will have the diplomatic, diplomatic, legal, operational, and communications options to manage it, prevent escalation, and maintain the initiative.
In short, Greece’s success in the face of a potential Turkish reaction to the GSI will not depend on whether it can prove that it is capable of escalating the situation.
It will depend on whether it can manage the crisis without losing control of the escalation, protect its work and interests, preserve the European dimension of the GSI, and steer the situation from crisis back to stability.
Author of the article:
Political Scientist – International Relations Specialist
Former Director General - Directorate General
National Defense and International Relations Policy (GDPAAD)
Ministry of National Defense (YPETHA)












