By maintaining the austerity cuts imposed by the memoranda on local government (-65%), the government—of collusion, wiretapping, and cover-ups—is «launching» an agenda of «reforms»: a new Code, a constitutional revision.
A. As for the constitutional revision, the weather is cloudy; the Code forecasts stormy winds and thunderstorms. It will be interesting to see where KEDE stands on this. The majority, as a consistent cheerleader—despite its valid specific observations—finds improvements and small victories in every initiative of the Ministry of the Interior. Proposals and observations from the minority aimed at effectively advocating for joint decision-making are, when not ignored, ridiculed.
At the workshop on constitutional revision, despite the exclusion of the Left (Kouvelis, rapporteur in 2001) and distinguished constitutional scholars (Sotirelis, Kontiadis, Kaidatzis), particularly the rapporteurs for the 2001 revision (286 out of 300 members of parliament)—Messrs. Pavlopoulos and Venizelos—completely dismantled the Mitsotakis government’s effort. They spoke of sloppiness, a lack of constitutional ethics, and an attempt in the Code to create government-controlled municipalities (Pavlopoulos) and anti-European and anti-constitutional interference (Venizelos) in Article 730 (adjudication of employee appeals). See also the presidium’s laudatory statement. Like night and day.
B. In the Code, the Minister of the Interior considers the technocratic streamlining—the classification of hundreds of scattered legislative provisions—to be a «major» reform. This is functionally positive, but too little, too late. Neo-centralism dominates the articles; despite the full incorporation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG), it is not reflected in the Code at all.
In terms of finances, the austerity measure under Article 446 of the Memorandum applies only to local government; there is no mention of the resilience tax (a primarily local tax, currently 1.5 billion). It establishes two funds to support municipalities from statutory resources, CAP 1% and 0.5%, under Articles 538, 540, without the participation of a representative of local government, while under Article 543, the minister may allocate the 0.2% as he sees fit. It limits (Article 438) the Green Fund’s resources for local governments to 3% (KEDE is requesting at least 10% for environmental restoration and the implementation of urban plans), which, of course, is managed—objectively, following KEDE’s opinion—by the Ministry of the Interior.
Through a deliberate effort to shift public outrage toward the municipalities, Article 459 makes it mandatory—and subject to repressive enforcement—to directly charge property owners along the street for the costs of reconstructing and maintaining sidewalks and for a portion of the costs of acquiring public spaces. Creating a stir over a new development fee, Articles 392–396, by consolidating two existing property taxes—TAP and FIX—which are already collected through the Public Power Corporation (PPC), allowing the rate of 0.30% on the property value to be increased to 0.70%.
At the same time, it excludes from the exclusive jurisdiction of local government authorities the imposition of a right-of-way fee and a fine for the restoration of road networks that are left in a state of disrepair due to excavations, natural gas and fiber-optic companies, Article 633. Indicative of the «scope of integration» of the ECHTA is that nowhere is the consent of KEDE or the relevant local government required, not even on issues of local spatial planning and development, e.g., urban planning Articles 336–339, the absence of a substantive role in development planning, and the lack of provisions for reserving electrical space for self-generation from renewable energy sources.
If we combine this with the absence of a representative on the disciplinary board for elected officials, the picture of how local government is treated as a civil service entity becomes complete.
C. I saved for last the «Frankenstein» electoral system of multiple-choice, second-choice mayoral voting, instead of the democratic legitimacy of 50%+1 (a spell against Athens’ nightmare: Doukas instead of Bakoyannis). Most likely, in large cities, with vote shares around 30%, mayors will govern with 60% of the seats, and an opposition that will only be able to take the initiative in discussing issues and alternative economic policies.
A major issue of validity: the introduction of electronic voting (problematic in the context of European institutional realities—German Constitutional Court, Venice Commission, etc.). There is no provision for political oversight either in the Central Election Commission or in the local polling stations, Articles 66–67. Honestly, can there be even a shred of trust in the Pretador government, given the trolls who «infiltrated» the Ministry of the Interior?;
D. What really matters for the progressive democratic opposition within the collective bodies of local government is that every reform effort be guided by alignment with the European acquis, the substantive application of the principles of subsidiarity and fair, sustainable development. The economic and administrative autonomy of local government bodies must be safeguarded through decentralization and by ensuring that local public policies are implemented democratically, even in an environment of artificial intelligence.
For the most part, these are described in the Constitution, in Articles 101 and 102, which could be improved, although a prerequisite for revising the Constitution is, in principle, its implementation, something foreign to the current corrupt regime. It is our duty to overthrow it, both through the ballot box and through social action.
*Member of the KEDE Board of Directors, former mayor of Aigaleo
